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          The fisheries sector is a fundamental global industry for human prosperity worldwide as fish 
and fish products are among the most-traded food commodities worldwide. However, the fisheries 
sector is linked to a high degree of illegality. Fisheries crime is a multifaceted phenomenon – 
frequently transnational and organised in nature – which comprises a range of various crimes along 
the fisheries value chain, including corruption, money laundering as well as tax and customs fraud. 
The abalone poaching and trafficking crisis in South Africa is a prime example of  fisheries crime: 
organised criminal syndicates control the (illegal) lucrative trade of abalone starting from poaching in 
the coastal waters of South Africa until the abalone ends up in East Asia. The syndicates take 
advantage of the sensitive socio-economic dynamics in South Africa’s coastal communities for 
financial gain by recruiting local poachers and using highly organised networks to smuggle abalone to 
East Asia. The illegal trade in abalone is one significant factor that threatens the species’ survival, 
thus these criminal syndicates must be disrupted and their activities combated. This dissertation 
examines legal tools to do so.  
 
          During the 2
nd
 International Symposium on Fisheries Crime it was pointed out that ‘given the 
inter-connected and complex nature a successful law enforcement approach to addressing these 
crimes cannot focus exclusively on one type only; rather, what is required is a coordinated criminal 
law enforcement response at the domestic and international level that recognises the wide variety of 
forms fisheries crime can take’
1
. This extends beyond the scope of fishing offences and is rooted in 
the use of all potentially applicable laws. This dissertation examines the applicability of the Marine 
Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, the Customs 
and Excise Act 91 of 1964 as well as the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 
2004 to the abalone and trafficking crisis. The aim is to assess the South African legal framework as 
well as existing case law to determine how South Africa’s courts have approach the prosecution of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
          Around the globe the fisheries sector offers ample opportunities to alleviate poverty, hunger and 
malnutrition, generate economic growth and ensure better use of natural resources.
2
 Fisheries make 
significant contributions in terms of employment, food security and nutrition as well as trade for 
developing countries.
3
 An estimated 57 million people worldwide rely on small-scale fisheries and 
aquaculture for their livelihoods
4
 and fish continues to be a cheap source of protein for the poor.
5
 The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that world fish 
consumption will increase by 19 % by 2026, noting that fish consumption will increase more strongly 
in developing countries.
6
 The trade in fish and fisheries products continues to be of integral 
importance to government revenues and developing countries remain the primary exporters of fish 
and fisheries products.
7
           
 
          South Africa’s marine environment is shaped by two great currents: the cold Benguela current 
on the west coast and the warm Agulhas current on the east coast.
8
 These two currents contribute to 
the high levels of marine biodiversity and endemic species which support diverse artisanal and 
commercial fisheries along South Africa’s 3000km long coastline.
9
 The fisheries sector in South 
Africa comprises 22 commercial fisheries sector and is worth around R6 billion yearly.
10
 Some 27000 
South Africans are directly employed in the commercial sector and thousands more depend on fishery 




                                                          
2
 Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) ‘The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture’ (2016); the United Nations (UN) has recognised the importance of fisheries in sustainable 
development and dedicated Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)14 to ‘conserve and sustainably use the 
oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development, see: UN  ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development’ Resolution A/Res/70/1 adopted by General Assembly on 25 September 
2015. 
3
 C Finegold ‘The importance of fisheries and aquaculture to development’ in P Wramner et al (eds) Fisheries, 
Sustainability and Development (2009) 353 -364. 
4
 Ibid at 354. 
5
 Beveridge, M et al ‘Meeting the food and nutrition needs of the poor: the roleof fish and the opportunities and 
challenges emerging from the rise of aquaculture’ (2013) 83 Journal of Fish Biology at 1068. 
6
 OECD-FAO ‘Agricultural Outlook 2017-2026’ available at http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/news-




 WWF-SA ‘Fisheries: Facts and Trends South Africa’ (2011) WWF Reports at 3 - 4. 
9
 Ibid at 3. 
10
 J Duncan et al ‘Ocean facts and futures: Valuing South Africa’s ocean economy’ (2016) WWF Report at 11. 
11




          A significant threat to the opportunities that the fishery sectors offer is the overexploitation of 
marine resources; 42% of South African fish stocks are over-exploited.
12
 The overexploitation of 
South Africa’s marine resources impacts negatively on livelihoods and income results in loss of 
potential food protein and causes the loss of the traditional fishing culture associated with South 
Africa’s coastal communities.
13
 The illegal exploitation of fisheries deprives local governments of 
highly valuable resources.
14
 One of the most overexploited marine resources is the South African 
abalone.
15
      
1.1.1 South Africa’s abalone fishery 
          The abalone is a type of large sea snail with a flat shell and out of the five species of abalone 
found in South Africa only one, namely the halitotis midea, is commercially exploited.
16
 It is locally 
known as ‘perlemoen’ or referred to as ‘white gold’ and is endemic to the coastal waters of South 
Africa.
17
  The abalone is particularly vulnerable to over-exploitation: First, the abalone occupies the 
shallow inshore waters from Cape Columbine on the west coast to Port St Johns in the Eastern Cape, 
usually occurring in waters less than 10 metres deep.
18
 Thus, it is relatively easy to access the abalone. 
Moreover, the abalone grows slowly and reaches sexual maturity at around seven years of age.
19
 
These biological factors, coupled with the high demand from Asia, especially mainland China and 
Hong Kong, render the abalone vulnerable to the impacts of over-harvesting.
20
 In Asia the abalone is 




          South Africa’s commercial abalone fishery dates back to the late 1940s.
22
 It was initially run on 
an open-access basis but was soon regulated through catch licenses starting in 1954.
23
 However, the 
catch licenses did not prescribe a catch nor size limit for abalone. The lack of regulation in 
combination with increasing demand for abalone from key importer countries led to unsustainable 
                                                          
12
 Ibid at 3. 
13
 Ibid at 12. 
14
 Andre Standing ‘Criminality in Africa’s fishing industry: a threat to human security’ (2017) Africa Security 
Brief No 33 at 4.  
15
 J Duncan et al ‘Ocean facts and futures: Valuing South Africa’s ocean economy’ (2016) WWF Report at 12. 
16
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  2. 
17
 WWF-SA ‘Fisheries: Facts and Trends South Africa’ (2011) WWF Reports at 12. 
18
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  2. 
19
 South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) ‘South African abalone’ (2015) available at 




 Lambrechts D and Goga K, 'Money and Marginalisation: The Lost War Against Abalone Poaching in South 
Africa' (2016) 45 South African Journal of Political Studies at 234. 
22
 Ibid at 234 – 235. 
23
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 




levels of abalone harvesting in 1965.
24
 The declining abalone stocks forced the state to impose 
limitations and quotas on trade; notably these limitations were motivated not only by poaching 
activities but also environmental reasons including encroachment of predators.
25
 Due to these 
concerns, restrictions were implemented since 1968, with the total quota steadily being reduced. 
During the 1990s the poaching of abalone started to take off and abalone became a commodity traded 
by gangs.
26
 In the following years the state attempted to manage the declining abalone stocks and 
related poaching thereof. In 2001 subsistence fishing rights were replaced with limited commercial 
fishing rights and in 2003 the recreational fishery of abalone was closed.
27
 In the early 2000s abalone 
poaching rose to crisis levels and thus the state attempted to curb the decline of abalone stocks.  In 
2008 the commercial fishery of abalone was closed as well but soon re-opened. In 2003/2004 a new 
abalone policy was adopted that entailed commercial rights for abalone being issued for 10 years. 
Besides those measures, South Africa has undertaken other efforts to manage declining stocks as early 
as the 2000s with enforcement operations such as Neptune which was followed by Operation Trident, 
the ‘Green Scorpions’ and the establishment of an environmental court in Hermanus.
28
 However, 
these efforts were closed down with the state claiming budget constraints despite their effectiveness 
which left many puzzled why those efforts were not prioritised.
29
  The abolishment of the Hermanus 
environmental court is a great indication of a lack of political will to conserve South Africa’s fast 
depleting marine resources.
30





          Abalone poaching, namely the physical act of unauthorized removal of abalone from the 
seafloor and arranging for its onwards sale, threatens the survival of the abalone. It is estimated that 
illegal harvesting of abalone from South African shores comprise more than 90% of the total abalone 
                                                          
24
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  2. 
25
 Lambrechts D & Goga K, 'Money and Marginalisation: The Lost War Against Abalone Poaching in South 
Africa' 2016 (45) South African Journal of Political Studies at 236. 
26
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  2. 
27
 Ibid at 2. 
28
 Lambrechts D and Goga K, 'Money and Marginalisation: The Lost War Against Abalone Poaching in South 
Africa' 2016 (45) South African Journal of Political Studies P 238. 
29
 Ibid at 238. 
30
 P Snijman ‘Hermanus’ Environmental Court: does it protect the environment?’ (2005) 12 News and Views for 
Magistrates at 2.  
31
 This dissertation focuses on the poaching and trafficking of abalone, however it is necessary to mention that 
there are other contributing factors for the decline of abalone stocks in South African waters; the inward 
migration of a lobster species destroys abalone territory is attributed to the decline in shellfish’s numbers.  
See: Liwalam Madikiza ‘Review and analysis of the status of abalone (haliotis midae) fishery in South Africa’ 




production and is estimated at a value of R1 billion.
32
 The increase in abalone poaching is attributed to 
four factors.
33
 Firstly, the weakening of the South African rand against the US dollar in the 1990 
created favourable conditions for those trading commodities in dollars. The costs of poaching, 
concealing and shipping of abalone are paid in Rands, whereas on Asian markets the already valuable 
abalone is sold in dollars, meaning that abalone was a proverbial gold mine.
34
 Secondly, the pre-
existing presence of large and efficient Chinese organised crime networks contributed to abalone 
trafficking as illicit trade routes between South Africa and East Asia were already firmly 
established.
35
 A third enabling factor for the rise in abalone poaching and trafficking is the difficulty 
to effectively control South Africa’s borders. The difficulty of devising and executing border controls, 
especially at commercial ports, remains a challenge.
36
 Fourthly, Steinberg identifies the ‘mutation in 
the socio-political identities of the coloured fishing communities on the abalone-rich shoreline during 
South Africa’s transition to democracy’ as a necessary condition for the rise of the illicit abalone 
market.
37
 During apartheid, the commercial abalone rights were reserved for white individuals, which 
left the non-whites in the role of providing cheap labour.
38
 Poaching of abalone started to thrive in 
coastal communities and many frustrated with ‘on the one hand the expectation that democracy ought 
to be coupled with the speedy implementation of a just fishing regime and on the other hand a deeply 
held suspicion that the new government would betray the working class’.
39
 These factors combined 
provided an environment in which abalone poaching became a lucrative illicit trade.  
 
 Organised criminal syndicates operate the illicit trade in abalone.
40
 The syndicates take 
advantage of the sensitive socio-economic dynamics for their own financial gain by recruiting 
poachers from local communities who feel distanced from the government and feel entitled to extract 
the abalone for their livelihoods and nutrition.
41
 The local poachers become part of highly organised 
networks that eventually smuggle the abalone to East Asia, where high profits can be made from the 
                                                          
32
 Parliament of the Province of the Western Cape ‘Report of the Standing Committee on economic 
opportunities, tourism and agriculture on the public hearings held to determine the impact of abalone poaching 
on small-scale fishing communities in the Western Cape, dated 14 June 2017’ (2017) 
33
 Raemaekers, S et al ‘Review of the causes of the rise of the illegal South African abalone fishery and 
subsequent closure of the rights-based fishery’ (2011) 43 Ocean & Coastal Management. 
Steinberg J ‘The illicit abalone trade in South Africa (2005) ISS Paper 105 
34
 Steinberg J ‘The illicit abalone trade in South Africa (2005) ISS Paper 105 at 2. 
35
 Ibid at 3. 
36
 Ibid at 4. 
37
 Ibid at 2. 
38
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  3. 
39
 Steinberg J, 'The illicit abalone trade in South Africa' 2005 Institute for Security Studies  at 6. 
40
 Raemaekers, S et al ‘Review of the causes of the rise of the illegal South African abalone fishery and 
subsequent closure of the rights-based fishery’ (2011) 43 Ocean & Coastal Management; P Gastrow ‘Triad 
Societies and Chinese organised crime in South Africa’ (2001) ISS Paper No 41 
41
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 






 Abalone poaching and related trade is often perpetrated by organized criminal 
networks that are involved in a number of associated criminal activities
43
, such as money laundering, 
tax evasion, drug or human trafficking and corruption. Despite past efforts to combat abalone 
poaching, the criminal syndicates continue to make profits from illegally sourcing and trading 
abalone. They are driven by the high demand for the valuable delicacy from Asia.
44
 The illegal trade 
in poached abalone presents a significant loss in revenues for South Africa. To illustrate, it is 
estimated that the loss per annum ranges somewhere between R500 million and R1 billion.
45
 
1.2 Relevance of the study 
          The relevance of this study lies in the fact that the state of abalone resources is critical. The 
abalone stocks have been declining over the last decade.
46
 Poor fisheries management, ecological 
conditions and poaching have contributed to the current abalone crisis.
47
 The World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) estimates that 95% of the abalone stocks in South Africa are being fished illegally.
48
The total 
allowable catch for abalone for the past three years has been less than 100 tons; however estimates 
reveal that around 3000 tons are harvested.
49
 The South African abalone stocks are in decline and the 
depleted stocks cannot recover unless illegal fishing is dramatically reduced. 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
1. What types of crimes occur at each stage of the abalone value chain?  
2. What legal tools are available to prosecutors to punish abalone poaching syndicates? 
3. What opportunities arise from using the previously identified tools?  
1.4 Scope of the research 
          The scope of this research is limited in three ways. Firstly, this dissertation will focus on 
abalone poaching and trafficking cases after 2003 as most legislative changes were made before 2003. 
Secondly, key features of abalone poaching can be categorized as opportunistic or highly organized. 
                                                          
42
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  2. 
43
 Regan Thaw, ‘WWF: 95% of abalone stocks from SA being fished illegally’ IOL 15 February 2017 available 
at http://ewn.co.za/2017/02/15/wwf-95-of-abalone-stocks-from-sa-being-fished-illegally, accessed on 25 
January 2018 
44
 Lau, Wilson ‘An Assessment of South African dried abalone Haliotis midae consumption and trade in Hong 
Kong’ (2018) TRAFFIC Report at 29 – 41. 
45




 Raemaekers, S et al ‘Review of the causes of the rise of the illegal South African abalone fishery and 
subsequent closure of the rights-based fishery’ (2011) 43 Ocean & Coastal Management at 433 -445. 
48
 Regan Thaw, ‘WWF: 95% of abalone stocks from SA being fished illegally’ IOL 15 February 2017 available 
at http://ewn.co.za/2017/02/15/wwf-95-of-abalone-stocks-from-sa-being-fished-illegally, accessed on 25 
January 2018 
49
 Raemaekers, S et al ‘Review of the causes of the rise of the illegal South African abalone fishery and 




As opposed to opportunistic abalone poaching, the highly organized groups undertake both shore and 
boat-based poaching, are active within a wider geographic range, have higher capital investments as 
well has higher yields, use more expensive gear and high-powered vessels and have sophisticated 
counter-intelligence measures in place.
50
This dissertation will focus on the abalone poaching activities 
of highly organized groups. Thirdly, as mentioned above, the organised crime syndicates involved in 
abalone poaching and trafficking have strong links to other crimes. This dissertation will focus on 
offences that enable abalone poaching and subsequent trade, namely economic crimes such as 
corruption, tax fraud and money laundering. Other crimes that are linked to those syndicates, like drug 
or human trafficking, will not be addressed in this dissertation as they do not enable abalone poaching 
and trafficking per se.
51
  
1.5 Methodology and structure of the dissertation  
          This dissertation is based on a desk-top study of relevant legislation, policies, regulations, 
jurisprudence as well as academic commentary relating to fisheries crime and particularly abalone 
poaching and trafficking. The main purpose of this study is to identify and assess the legal tools 
available to prosecute syndicates involved in abalone poaching and trafficking. Having provided an 
introduction to South Africa’s abalone sector, this chapter is divided into a further four chapters. 
 
          Chapter 2 explains the theoretical underpinning of this dissertation. It describes abalone 
poaching and trafficking in the context of transnational environmental crime and the paradigm shift 
towards recognising the transnational and organised nature of ‘fishery crime’. For this purpose the 
chapter relies on international sources, namely publications by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime.  
 
          Chapter 3 constructs a profile of abalone poaching and trafficking. Considering the difficulty of 
describing the exact modus operandi of criminal syndicates involved in abalone poaching, this chapter 
relies on existing research by non-governmental organisations (such as TRAFFIC and the Institute for 
Security Studies(ISS)) , government publications and newspaper articles. Using a textual analysis 
approach this chapter describes the methods used to poach and traffic abalone and identifies the actors 
that are involved as well as their level of sophistication. The chapter serves the purpose to identify the 
crimes that are committed in order to poach and traffic abalone and highlights the inter-dependence of 
these crimes.  
                                                          
50
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 
analysis' (2014) TRAFFIC Report  at  2. 
51
 The link between organised crime in the fishing industry and trafficking of persons and drugs has been well 
documented; see: UNODC ‘Transnational organised crime in the fishing industry: focus on: trafficking in 





          Chapter 4 provides an overview of the regulatory framework related to abalone poaching and 
trafficking and identifies the tools available to prosecute those activities. This includes South African 
legislation dealing with offences that enable the poaching and trafficking of abalone and analyses case 
law dealing with the identified provisions. Essentially, this chapter applies the relevant legislation to 
the conduct identified in chapter 3 and examines to which players along the abalone value chain the 
provisions apply. Furthermore, the chapter examines the approach South African courts have taken 
towards punishing abalone poachers and traffickers by analysing case law relating to offences 
identified in the first part of the chapter.  
 
          Chapter 5 assesses the provisions and legal tools identified in Chapter 4.This chapter identifies 
strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of using each legal tool and concludes this 
dissertation by providing suggestions for the way forward. The analysis is guided by the ‘Wildlife and 
Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit’.
52
 The aim of the toolkit is to provide comprehensive guidance in 






























                                                          
52
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) ‘Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit’ (2012). 
53




 CHAPTER 2: ABALONE POACHING AND TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME 
 
      Abalone poaching and trafficking needs to be understood in its broader context as a transnational 
organised environmental crime. As this dissertation aims to critically assess legal tools available to 
prosecute those who poach and smuggle abalone, it is important to examine abalone poaching and 
trafficking as part of a bigger picture, rather than examine it in isolation. 
2.1 Transnational environmental crime 
           A good starting point would be to look at the elements of transnational organised 
environmental crime individually. There is no universally agreed upon definition of environmental 
crime, though it is commonly understood to cover illegal activities that harm the environment and are 
aimed at benefitting individuals or groups or companies from the exploitation of, damage to, trade or 
theft of natural resources, including but not limited to serious crimes and transnational organised 
crime.
54
 Environmental crime has been rising at astonishing rates over the past decade and brings 
disastrous consequences: the environment is the very foundation of sustainable development, peace 
and security and vastly expanding crimes against the environment endanger wildlife populations, 
ecosystems, sustainable livelihoods and revenue streams to governments.
55
Environmental crime can 
be a cross-border crime, in other words transnational, in different circumstances. This includes that 
environmental crime can involve international commodities that are trafficked illegally from one part 
of the world to another.
56
 This phenomenon is generally referred to as wildlife crime. 
2.1.1 Wildlife crime 
          One category of environmental crime is wildlife crime, which often involves the trade in 
wildlife.
57
 Defining wildlife crime is difficult as every country affords its wildlife protection in 
different ways.
58
However, wildlife crime has been understood to comprise a ‘myriad of diverse and 
sometimes overlapping offences from hunting, processing, exporting and importing, trafficking, 
supplying, to receiving, possessing and consuming fauna and flora’.
59
 Wildlife crime is increasingly 
been recognised as a transnational and organised crime as a good deal of attention has been paid to the 
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links between illegal wildlife trade and professional criminal groups.
60
 This link makes it necessary to 
examine wildlife crime in the context of transnational and organised crime.           
2.2 Transnational Crime 
          On the international level, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime
61
 defines an organised criminal groups as a ‘structured group or three or more persons, existing 
for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain or directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit’.
62
 A ‘serious crime’ is any crime that is punishable by four or more 
years in prison and a ‘structured group’ does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, 
continuity of its membership or a developed structure’
63
.  This definition highlights that essentially 
any pattern of profit –motivated, serious criminal activity can be considered an organised crime and 
transnational wildlife crime trade fulfils these criteria if the penalties of the country in question are 
sufficiently high.  
 
          The participants of the 2
nd
 International Symposium on Fisheries Crime
64
 used this definition to 
suggest that ‘fisheries crime should be treated as a transnational organised crime as long as it carries 
the elements of (i) a structured group, (ii) committing serious crime – an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least 4 years or more, (iii) gaining material/financial benefit or 
profit-oriented, (iv) activities done in more than one country.
65
   
2.3 Transnational organised wildlife crime in South Africa 
          As concerns transnational organised wildlife crime, South Africa has recognised that ‘until 
now, the low risk associated with environmental crime in South Africa and across the world has 
provided a relatively safe environment for criminal networks in which to operate. Taking advantage of 
the complexity of this type of crime, criminals operating internationally have significantly benefited 
and thrived while the international law enforcement community has only recently started to 
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          Wildlife crime is viewed as a form of transnational organised crime with particularly negative 
impacts on conservation and security
67
. Transnational organised criminal networks have been 
operating in South Africa since the 1990s and have led to a significant escalation in the poaching and 
trafficking of the country’s wild resources that are being sold on illicit markets in other parts of the 
world. According to South African legislation
68
, organised crime constitutes and is committed by a (a) 
by a person , group of persons or syndicates acting in (i) an organised fashion; or (ii) a manner which 
could result in substantial financial gain for the person, group of persons or syndicate involved (e) in 
respect of the hunting, importation, exportation, possession, buying and selling of endangered species 
or any product thereof as may be described (f) in more than one province or outside the borders of the 
Republic by the same perpetrator or perpetrators, and in respect of which the prevention at national 




           The National Integrated Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking
70
 (NISCWT) was adopted 
with the vision of a ‘well-resourced and implemented integrated, multidisciplinary and consolidated 
law enforcement approach to break the illicit value chain of wildlife trafficking in South Africa and 
beyond’.
71
 The policy document recognises wildlife trafficking as a national security threat and 
declares the trafficking of abalone a priority taxon over the first five years of the NISCWT’s 
implementation plan.
72
 Its primary goal is to ‘direct law enforcement structures in South Africa and 
empower them with the necessary means to prevent the increasing scourge of wildlife trafficking, in 
the country itself and abroad’.
73
In order to achieve this goal, the NISCWT sets out three strategic 
goals, the first of which is to improve law enforcement to effectively investigate, prosecute and 




          The recognition of wildlife crime as both an environmental and transnational security issue has 
two implications: firstly, the transnational dimension of wildlife crime implies that no state can tackle 
the crime on its own.
75
 Secondly, a comparison to other transnational organised crimes can offer 
insights on how to address and combat wildlife crime.
76
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2.3.1 South Africa: Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
          South Africa has recognised the need to address wildlife crime. This follows the international 
trend to take matters of wildlife crime seriously. On an international level, the emerging threat of 
poaching and trafficking has long been recognized but the global wildlife crime regime is still 
developing. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora
77
 (CITES) is a cornerstone of that regime. However, this regime is a trade agreement and as 
such not primarily concerned with the conservation or protection of species. South Africa is a party to 
CITES. The provisions of CITES aim to ensure that international trade of wild species of flora and 
fauna does not threaten their survival by imposing certain trade controls. Species covered by CITES 
are listed in one of its three appendices according to the degree that the species is threatened by 
international trade and the level of protection the species requires. The appendix dictates the measures 
of control that is afforded to a species. Appendix I lists species threatened with extinction, meaning 
that trade in these species in only permitted in exceptional circumstances.
78
Appendix II includes 
species that are not necessarily threatened with extinctions but in which trade must be controlled in 
order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival.
79
 The last Appendix, III, contains species 
that are listed in at least on country which has asked that other CITES Parties assists with controlling 
trade in that species.
80
 Essentially CITES provides a baseline framework on how member states 
should regulate wildlife trade and manage the commonly agreed limitations.  
 
          Among the efforts to combat abalone poaching and trafficking, South Africa listed the H. midae 
in CITES’s appendix III in 2007 which contains species that are protected at least in one country and 
asks other countries for assistance in controlling the trade. In listing the abalone in Annex III, all legal 
abalone exports leaving the country are required to be issued a permit by the South Africa’s CITIES 
Management authority. However, the effort was fruitless since in 2010 the abalone was delisted, 
despite increased levels of illegal poaching, due to difficulties in the implementation.
81
 Therein lies 
the flaw with CITES: if wildlife is not listed under CITES and is taken illegally from one country and 
transported to another. The protected species lists of most countries are limited to domestic species, 
                                                          
77
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora singed at Washington, 
D.C., on 3 March 1973. South Africa ratified the convention on 15/07/1975. 
78
 CITES s(III) 
79
 CITES s(IV) 
80
 CITES s(V) 
81
 De Greef K & Raemaekers S 'South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap 




meaning that there is no legal basis in the national law of the importing country to challenge the 
import or sale of the species in question.  
2.4 Fisheries crime as part of wildlife crime 
          In most literature, offences relating to fisheries are examined separately to wildlife crime. For 
instance, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is considered an environmental crime. 
The commercial fishing industry is made up of a complex web of actors and fisheries that deal with 
ship registries, fish licensing authorities, fishers, fish processing workers, fish processing plants 
owners and operators, fleet suppliers, refuelling service providers, recruitment agencies, fisher trades 
and wholesalers as well as fish distributors.
82
 The complexity of the fisheries sector also means that 
the fisheries value chain is non-linear.
83
 The fisheries value chain encompasses different stages: 
preparation, fishing, processing, landing, transporting and finally the sale. During each stage different 
actors are relevant. The advantage of examining the fisheries sector using the value chain and 
different stages thereof is that it highlights that different types of criminal offences occur at each stage 
and are perpetrated by different actors. This can shed light on potential opportunities for law 
enforcement interventions throughout the fisheries sector.
84
   
 
          Along the fisheries value chain different types of crimes are committed and these crimes enable 
the illegal fishing and subsequent trade in illegally-sourced fish. Generally speaking, the main types 
of crimes that occur are fraud, forgery, corruption, tax crime and money laundering.  According to the 
UNODC fraud and forgery as well as corruption are committed throughout the fisheries value chain.
85
 
Money laundering and related tax crimes on the other hand occur at the later stages of the value chain, 
namely during the sale. Notably, during the transportation stage other crimes might occur. The 
criminal syndicates that are involved in fisheries crimes might also be involved in drug trafficking or 
human trafficking.
86
 The inter-dependence of the crimes signifies the shift from regarding illegal 
fishing as a fisheries management problem to considering it a ‘fisheries crime’.
87
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2.4.1 From an IUU fishing paradigm towards a ‘fisheries crime’ paradigm 
          Fisheries crime remains an ill-defined legal concept.
88
A starting point to understand the 
complexity of the concept is to contrast it from IUU fishing.  Fishery crime is not to be confused with 
the concept of IUU fishing. According to the UNODC the discussion of illegal activities in the fishing 
sector and the devising or legal mechanisms to combat the activities has taken place within the 
framework of IUU fishing.
89
 The term IUU fishing was defined by the FAO and covers a number of 
activities
90
: illegal fishing refers to activities that violate the national laws or international obligations 
relevant to fisheries management and can be conducted by national as well as foreign vessels in the 
waters under the jurisdiction. Unreported fishing refers to activities that have not been reported or 
have been misreported to the relevant national authorities in contravention of national laws. 
Unregulated fishing refers to activities that are in the area of application of a relevant regional 
fisheries management organisation that are conducted by vessels without a nationality or in areas (or 
fish stocks) in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures. 
Unregulated fishing also refers to fishing activities that are conducted in a manner inconsistent with 
state responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law.
91
 
Notably, unreported and unregulated fishing is not necessarily an illegal activity. 
 
          It can be argued that ‘by far the most dominant paradigm to date internationally and in South 
Africa has been to address illegal fishing through an IUU lens’.
92
 In some jurisdictions ‘fisheries 
offences in domestic jurisdictions have traditionally been regarded as conservation or fisheries 
management problem, rather than a criminal concern, which attracts relatively lenient administrative 
sanctions’.
93
Traditionally, the South African fisheries management relied on single-species quotas of 
which the total allowable catch is allocated in portions to commercial, recreational and small-scale 
with fishing rights. On a legislative and policy level illegal fishing was understood as those activities 
that circumvent the rules concerning management and conservation of fish stocks.
94
 In some instances 
these activities are considered a ‘crime’ under national law. South Africa is relative unique in that 
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most violations of the Marine Living Resources Act of 18 of 1998 amount to a criminal offence.
95
The 
primary traditional government response to combatting illegal harvesting domestically has been to 
increase compliance and enforcement mechanisms. As concerns abalone poaching, these compliance 
and enforcement mechanisms included the establishment of the environmental court and increased 
inshore patrolling.
96
 These measures, which are rooted in a fisheries management approach, were 
implemented despite evidence that abalone poaching was largely perpetrated by organised groups.
97
 
In combination with factors that gave rise to the abalone poaching crisis, the government is unable to 
curb illegal abalone harvesting. 
 
          Arguably, there is a realignment of thinking in regards to how illegal is viewed and tackled in 
South Africa.
98
 This is due to the strong drive to re-assess the nature of illegal fishing particularly in 
regards with its linked to transnational organised criminal activities.
99
  In 2014, the FAO released a 
report on the state of world fisheries in which it is recognised that ‘the realities of corruption and 
organised crime, which add complexity to the task of combatting IUU fishing, need to be addressed 
through supplementary means extending beyond the realm of fisheries control and enforcement’.
100
 In 
this line of thinking,  de Coning and Witbooi argue that ‘it is arguable that this alternative realm 
comprises the criminal law and procedure sphere and that the ‘supplementary means’ referred to 
constitute the additional investigation and enforcement tools that this realm brings to the problem-
solving table’.
101
 They suggest that ‘ideally illegal fishing should this be address from the realm of a 
comprehensive legislative and criminal justice system that takes adequate cognisance of the issues 
surrounding fisheries crime and that, accordingly, comprises the necessary legal and institutional tolls, 
as well as appropriately trained personnel, to ensure effective compliance, enforcement and 




         The paradigm shift towards ‘fisheries crime’ presents a new approach towards addressing illegal 
fishing that seeks to put the illegal fishing activities in a broader realm of crime and criminal 
justice.
103
As ‘the inability of the traditional model to date to curb illegal of fishing … might be 
remedied by taking a broader view of illegal activities associated with the fishing sector and drawing 
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on the strength of a more crime-based investigate approach to the problem’.
104
 Thus, in contrast to 
IUU fishing, fisheries crime includes a range of serious offences committed along the entire fisheries 
value chain.
105
 It is not only associated with fishing per se but extend to a wide variety of criminal 
offences such as corruption, document fraud, tax evasion and money laundering.
106
 The various types 
of offences enable illegal fishing and as such undermine the vital role of fisheries sectors by depriving 
states of valuable sources of income. In the context of abalone poaching and trafficking, as in many 
other practical scenarios, the concepts of IUU fishing and fisheries crime overlap: an illegal fishing 
offence in the IUU fishing context, i.e. fishing without a license, constitutes a fisheries crime in 
combination with other criminal offences along the fisheries value chain, i.e. corruption or document 
fraud. 
 
                  Fisheries crime is a multifaceted phenomenon that has an important transnational 
element.
107
 The nature of the fisheries sector renders it vulnerable to organised criminal activity due to 
its transnational element and the associated law enforcement challenges combined with weak 
regulatory regime.
108
 The transnational aspect of fisheries crime can derive from the nationality of the 
fisheries, the flag or the vessel, the water in which the fisheries crime takes place, the port where the 
vessel docks or where the catch is landed. Organised criminal syndicates are drawn to the fisheries 
sector because of its high potential profit on one hand and the low risk of enforcement. The link 
between the fisheries sector and transnational organised crime is twofold
109
: firstly, major 
transnational organised criminal groups may be directly involved in the fisheries crime by engaging in 
large-scale organised fishing activities or widespread document fraud, corruption or money 
laundering. Secondly, seemingly compliant transnational fishing operators may engage in parallel 
criminal activities, in other multi-level business operations can engage in laundering illegally caught 
fish by mixing them with the legally sourced products and selling them through legitimate trading 
relationships.
110
Fisheries crime is complex with organised criminal networks employing constantly 
changing business models and modus operandi.
111
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2.4.2 Implications of the paradigm shift towards ‘fisheries crime’ on enforcement 
          There are considerable challenges in prosecuting fisheries crime. Fundamentally, there is the 
issue that some crimes related to fisheries have been regarded as conservation or fisheries 
management problems rather than a criminal concern. These would be addressed with lenient 
sanctions and increased monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) meaning that enforcement has 
been confined to the fisheries sector.
112
 Furthermore, there are considerable challenges in 
investigating and prosecuting fisheries crime. 
 
          UNODC states that the largest single challenge is to ‘get an agency to investigate and regard 
fisheries crimes as important’.
113
 In regards abalone poaching is arguably a crime ‘without a face’ in 
contract to rhino poaching and receives far less attention from media campaigns, funders and 
researchers’.
114
The enforcement agencies, namely police forces, tax authorities or anti-corruption 
bodies have limited budgets and resources, meaning that priorities need to be set. The crimes that are 
perceived as most serious will be set as priorities and in some countries crime linked to the fisheries 





          The complex nature of fisheries crime hinders enforcement because fisheries crime rarely falls 
under the mandate of a single agency.
116
 The UNOCD identified that successful that a large number of 
successful cases against offenders of fisheries crimes are brought by anti- corruption authorities or the 
commercial arm of the police.
117
 Often if the conduct, that may lead to criminal charges, is identified 
the relevant authorities are satisfied with imposing administrative sanctions rather than reporting the 
case to a criminal authority.
118
 This highlights the importance of a high level of domestic cooperation.  
           
2.4.3 Mandates of relevant agencies in South Africa          
           In South Africa, the fisheries management falls within the mandate of the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and its Fisheries Control Officers (FCO). Today, the 
DAFF is responsible for the coordinating functions for the protection and conservation of abalone 
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The DAFF’s strategic plan from 2015/2016 to 2019/2020
120
 aims to ensure the conservation, 
protection and rehabilitation and recovery of depleted and degraded natural resources as well as 
updating recovery plans for the abalone sector.
121
 During the harvesting, transporting and processing 
stage the following authorities are relevant: the national Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
as well as provincial environmental departments employ Environmental Management Inspectorates 
(EMI).
122
 This network of environmental enforcement officials are tasked with enforcing 
environmental legislation and to do so are empowered to inter alia search premises, seize evidence 
and make arrests. As EMIs are not empowered to prosecute cases in court, they hand over all cases to 
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). EMIs are further supported by FOCs who also have 
extensive powers with and without warrants; including powers to enter and search fishing vessels, 




            On the other hand, organised crime activities fall within the mandate of the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) who are supported in their task to enforce legislation by the Serious Organised 
Crime Investigation Units.
124
 These Units are responsible for the prevention and investigation of 
projects relating to national as well as transnational organised crime related activities, including 
illegal abalone trade. For that purpose the Organised Crime Project Investigations allow for the 
application of cover and overt investigations to gather sufficient evidence against members of 
criminal syndicates. These Units operate with the objective to dismantle the functioning for criminal 
syndicates by prosecuting members and seizing their assets.  
 
          Additionally, money laundering and tax crimes fall within the mandate of the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS). SARS has the mandate to inter alia ensure optimal compliance with tax, 
customs and excise legislation and play a fundamental role during the trafficking stage as they oversee 
the facilitation of movements of goods and people entering and exiting the borders of South Africa.  
 
          Traditionally, there have been few coordinated efforts between these agencies but the 
prosecution of abalone poachers and traffickers requires close co-operation between environmental 
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authorities and non-environmental agencies.
125
 Law enforcement operations in terms of the fisheries 
crime paradigm necessitates a mind shift on the part of the main against involved in fisheries 
compliance.
126
 This issue is somewhat addressed in the newly adopted policy in wildlife trafficking
 
as 
one of its strategic objectives is to increase national, regional and international law enforcement 
collaboration and cooperation on combatting wildlife trafficking.
127
The policy sees the SAPS to play a 
key role in regional and international wildlife trafficking and combatting initiatives but makes 
reference only to the need to increase international collaborations rather than focusing on cooperation 
strategies within the SAPS, the SARS, the DAFF and the Serious Organised Crime Units.
128
  
2.5 Law enforcement responses to fisheries crime 
          The abalone fishery in South Africa has been recognised as one of the most difficult fisheries to 
manage due to the combination of its inshore nature, the adverse impacts of ecological factors on its 
stocks, its high value and the increasing organised black market trade in abalone.
129
 Nevertheless, 
there are compelling arguments in favour of combatting abalone poaching and trafficking and 
identifying appropriate legal mechanisms to do so.  
2.5.1 Motivation to combat abalone poaching and trafficking 
          The need to combat abalone poaching and trafficking is motivated by the economic, scientific 
and ecological as well as recreational importance of wildlife.
130
 As an endemic species to the South 
African coast the communities consider abalone as a part of the environment they inherited and want 
to pass onto their children, thus the conservation of abalone also has ethical and moral aspects to it.  
 
           Besides South Africa’s commitment to protect flora and fauna under CITES, the mandate can 
also be derived from the Constitutional environmental right. The South African Constitution contains 
the right to an environment not harmful to health or well-being; and to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that prevent ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure the ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting economic and social 
development.
131
 The protection and realisation of this environmental right serves as motivation to 
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combat abalone poaching. The abalone is part of the environment that the Constitution mandates to 
protect
132
 but the current populations of abalone prove the stocks have degraded to near extinction, 
meaning that future generations will not be able to make use of this natural resource if poaching 
continues.
133
 This highlights the need for conservation of abalone and from a legal perspective the 
effective prosecution of abalone poachers and traffickers can protect the environmental right.  
2.6 Types of law enforcement responses  
         Three main types of law enforcement responses to transnational environmental crime have been 
identified: administrative, civil and criminal responses.
134
 The nature of these responses varies and is 
based on different legal principles and systems of law. It is necessary to identify the different types of 
law enforcement responses as fisheries crimes along the abalone value chain are perpetrated by 
different actors, meaning that one type of response might be appropriate for conduct in one stage but 
another more effective for illegal conduct in another stage of the abalone value chain. 
2.6.1 Administrative measures 
          Administrative measures, namely administrative sanctions are used for minor breaches or 
breaches that can be regulated by exercising a statutory authority without recourse to the court 
systems.
135
 Therein is the advantage of administrative measures: they can resolve matters quickly and 
efficiently as they do not require court proceedings. However, administrative measures are perceived 
as a ‘soft option’
136
which can be a disadvantage if the wrongdoer is a repeat offender and the breach is 
serious. Yet, administrative responses might be appropriate where a regulator has frequent and on-
going contact with a regulated entity.
137
 
2.6.2 Civil measures 
          Civil measures, also known as civil remedies or penalties, are commonly used when the 
regulator wishes the court impose a monetary or another form of order that is not available under 
administrative measures.
138
 Civil action is prescribed by courts but civil action has some advantages 
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over criminal measures: the burden of proof for civil action is lower and there is greater flexibility 
which enables more innovative outcomes.
139
 
2.6.3 Criminal measures  
          Criminal measures, in other words criminal prosecution, are appropriate where the conduct in 
question is a more serious breach of legislation and the public expects a punishment. Generally, the 
South African fisheries management is based of single-species quotas of the total allowable catch are 
allocated in various sectors and access rights, or portions thereof are assigned in individual fishers. 
This also applies to the abalone sector. The evasion or circumvention of these rules is understood as 
illegal fishing which is prohibited by the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998.
140
 The violations of 
the MLRA amount to a criminal offence. Most legislation aimed at the protection of abalone contains 
that a failure to comply with its provisions constitutes and offence and prescribes maximum penalties 
to be imposed upon conviction. South African environmental legislation provides extensively for 
criminal sanctions but the use of criminal sanctions to punish environmental crime is often criticised.           
2.6.3.1 Weaknesses of using criminal measures  
         There are inherent weaknesses of criminal sanctions. Firstly, the criminal sanctions require 
costly and time intensive processes. The reactive nature of criminal law is refers to criminal sanctions 
being designed to react to offences that have already been committed as such are not suitable to 
prevent damage to the environment. In other words, if the abalone has been poached already criminal 
sanctions cannot rehabilitate the situation. In some circumstances standards of proof can be difficult 
because proof of commission of an offence must be beyond reasonable doubt; procedural safeguards 
are additional obstacles to prosecution because due process can make criminal prosecutions time-
consuming and cumbersome.
141
 South Africa faces another set of weaknesses in relation to criminal 
sanctions since its strained government resources lead to inadequate policing it is often court officials 
lack the expertise in environmental prosecutions. The lack of resources also makes investigations 
difficult as it undermines proper training and specialist scientific and expertise.
142
 There is a lack of 
public awareness when it comes to environmental crimes in South Africa and this lack of 
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          Nevertheless, there are strong arguments in favour of using criminal sanctions to punish 
abalone poachers and traffickers.
144
 The mere threat of criminal prosecutions can be sufficient to 
change behaviour and the avoidance of getting a criminal record can be an incentive to refrain from 
poaching. As opposed to other measures, criminal sanctions are serious and in some circumstances the 
state calls for prison sentences to be imposed because ‘a fine in probably factored into the syndicate’s 




          However, in order for criminal sanctions to be an effective deterrent the sanctions must be 
adequate. The DAFF Chief Director for Monitoring and Compliance, Ceba Mtoba, stated that ‘our 
sanctions are too lenient. Poachers are sentenced to community service’.
146
 The effective use of 
powers by inspectors in their investigations, followed by successful prosecutions can break up 
organised syndicates by arrests as well as seizure of instrumentalities. The objectives of effective 
prosecutions of abalone poachers and traffickers is on one hand to punish those who commit the 
crimes and deter other from committing similar offences and on the other hand make it impossible for 
the offender to commit the offences again. The former contains the additional objective to locals who 
harvest abalone legally and as such level the economic playing field. The latter includes both 
incarceration but also taking away the means of continuing the offence through forfeiture or related 
measures. The effectiveness of criminal sanctions imposed on abalone poachers and traffickers also 
depends on the functioning of court system, thus the role of the judiciary and prosecutors must be 
examined.  
 
2.7 The role of South Africa’s judiciary  
          A functioning court system is an integral part of any criminal justice system and is an important 
element of efforts to effectively prevent and supress abalone poaching and trafficking.
147
 The 
judiciary can support the protection of wildlife in two ways: firstly because the judiciary is tasked 
with the enforcement of relevant laws and secondly because the judiciary has a supervisory function 
to review decisions of the executive where these actions threaten wildlife.
148
 In relation to abalone 
poaching and trafficking the former is the main objective of the judiciary. The judiciary in South 
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Africa is structured as follows. The South African Constitution
149
 sets out the hierarchy of courts, with 
the Constitutional Court being the highest authority and deals with constitutional matters.
150
 Below 
the Constitutional Court in the hierarchy is the Supreme Court of Appeals
151
 (SCA) which deals with 
any matter on appeal, other than constitutional issues, and its decisions are binding on all lower 
courts.
152
 Following the SCA are the High Courts
153
, including the high courts of appeal and specialist 
courts established by statute. The High Courts are first instance courts in matters that are beyond the 
jurisdiction of magistrates courts or where the penal jurisdiction is unlimited and includes a sentence 
to life imprisonment. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the district and regional magistrates’ courts. 
District courts have jurisdiction on all criminal matters, with some exceptions, and pay impose 
sentences not exceeding three years in prison as well as fines not exceeding R60000.
154
 Regional 
magistrate courts have jurisdiction over criminal matters, except treason, and may impose penalties up 




          From 2003 to 2006 a specialist environmental court operated from Hermanus. The court had the 
primary he primary purpose to prosecute abalone poachers but also dealt with cases relating to other 
environmental issues. The first year of the court proved to be a success as the court heard 74 cases 
which resulted in 51 successful prosecutions, whereas in the last year of the court’s operation it 
achieved an 85% conviction rate.
156
  
2.7.1 The National Prosecuting Authority 
          The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is set up and empowered by the Constitution to 
institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state and to carry out essential functions.
157
 In regards 
to environmental crimes, the NPA derives is mandate from environmental related legislation and 
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2.7.2 The role of prosecutors 
          The role of public prosecutors is unique in the sense that they appear on behalf of the 
governments as the representative of the people.
159
 The prosecutor acts with the broad obligation to 
uphold the rule of law but is bound by ethical and professional duty to make sure that the accused 
receives a fair trial.
160
 If a prosecutor fails to fulfil the obligations the trial can lead to a miscarriage of 
justice, ranging from malicious prosecutions to wrongful convictions.
161
 A miscarriage of justice can 





          Where the prosecutor’s primary role as an advocate for the state in prosecuting offences is 
fundamental, the consultative and advisory role of the prosecutors during the investigations of an 
offence should be highlighted.
163
 Prosecutors do not get involved in the investigation of offences per 
se, but can provide valuable appropriate guidance and advice to environmental inspectors and police 
officers.
164
 If the prosecutor is involved in ensuring that sufficient and admissible evidence is gathered 
during the investigations phase, he or she will have a thorough knowledge of the case once it goes to 
court which can often make the difference between success and failure.
165
 An example of the good 
working relationship of prosecutors and investigators is the environmental court in Hermanus: during 
its operation the prosecutors became actively involved by providing a 24-hour hotline for inspectors 
and investigators; setting up systems to secure the integrity of evidence; making recommendations for 
amendments to legislation and assisting in the training of inspectors.
166
Arguably, these measures 




           
          However, South Africa has a limited availability of specialist prosecutors and magistrates 
trained in environmental law which can mean that there are insufficient prosecutors to cover all cases 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF ABALONE POACHING AND SUBSEQUENT 
TRADE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
          The poaching and subsequent illegal trade of abalone is typically perpetrated by actors from a 
broad spectrum of role-players, ranging from those at the water’s edge to highly organized 
syndicates.
169
 The illegal exploitation of abalone arguably has evolved into its own organized illicit 
industry that is controlled by street gangs at the shore and transnational syndicates which are involved 
with trafficking abalone to the Far East.
170
 Warchol and Harrington observe that in the last two 
decades the illegal trade in South African abalone evolved from localised small scale poachers to 
include more sophisticated criminal enterprises that are ready and willing to resort to violence to 
defend their harvest’.
171
 Their criminal activities are driven by the high demand for abalone in Asia, 
particularly Hong Kong and China, where abalone has become a delicacy and is served at weddings, 
corporate events or other important occasions.
172
The following chapter unravels this complex crime: it 
examines the different actors and their level of sophistication as well as criminal acts they perpetrate 
in order to understand the different possible charges and related legal tools to combat abalone 
poaching and trafficking.  
3.1 The harvesting of abalone           
          The first stage of the poaching and trafficking network is the production of abalone, in other 
words the physical act of poaching.
173
 The removal of abalone from the seafloor and arranging for its 
subsequent sale is predominantly the domain of the unemployed and the working class.
174
 Often 
operations take place at night, when  ‘divers’ harvest the abalone and once the abalone is poached, the 
catch is dropped off along the coast or estuaries where ‘runners’ swim the bags ashore and carry them 
to waiting vehicles which transport abalone to accumulation points or drying facilities.
175
 The 
majority of these  communities are impoverished and lack socio-economic development, which makes 
them easy prey for criminal syndicates that provide lucrative incentives for them to poach abalone in 
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order to sustain the flow of abalone.
176
 Large criminal syndicates may have their own poaching 
groups.
177
 Besides payments in cash, there are numerous reports that poachers are remunerated in 
recreational drugs, namely crystal methamphetamine which is referred to as ‘tik’.
178
The link between 
drug dealers and Asian abalone smugglers is well-known. Steinberg states that the proportion of 
abalone traded for drugs is substantial: Chinese criminals supply drugs to the drug lords that are able 
to gain cheap abalone that can be bartered for drugs.
179
In order to avoid detection, the poachers use a 
system of paid informants, including corrupt enforcement officials, to monitor enforcement activities 





          Where poachers and divers are not affiliated with a specific syndicate, they often sell the 
abalone to wholesalers or intermediaries who are able to connect with transnational syndicates and 
organize the transport of abalone offshore.
181
 Wholesalers can abuse the quota system by encouraging 
legal fishers to poach more abalone than they are allowed or by buying quotas
182
. Transporters may 
pay bribes to enforcement officials in order to facilitate safe passage.
183
 
3.3 The Processing of Abalone 
          Abalone needs to be processed, i.e. de-shelled and preserved as abalone can rot or become stale 
quickly once it is harvested.
184
This process is critical as the processing requires a good knowledge 
base to get a high price for the abalone. The majority of illegally sourced abalone is dried as the dried 
product offers several advantages over canned or live abalone for the subsequent trade. Live or frozen 
abalone has a distinctive smell which makes it difficult to ship or transport undetected, as opposed to 
the dried abalone, which weighs less and can be disguised more easily and can be preserved for 
months. Investigators have found abalone processing factories (APF) from Cape Town to Limpopo, 
which typically make up entire houses or commercial properties.
185
 These facilities often hold large 
amounts of abalone and equipment. The legal abalone processing factories in South Africa present an 
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opportunity to launder illegally-sourced abalone into the legal abalone harvest and prepare it for 
further trade.  
3.4 The trafficking of abalone out of South Africa 
          The ‘transporters’ operate at the final stage of the abalone trafficking. Goga finds that the 
methods of transport used by criminal syndicates to smuggle abalone to the destination states are 
threefold: abalone can be smuggled by sea or air ways using forged permits; or concealed among 
other export products; or customs officials are bribed to let smuggled abalone through.
186
 Again, there 
are high levels of corruption at border posts which facilitate the smuggling process. Officials in other 
departments have been implicated in corruption cases as well: officials of the Department of Home 





          However, there are two main ways to smuggle abalone out of South Africa into Hong Kong or 
China: the first possibility is to transport the abalone to a neighbouring country, namely Mozambique 
or Zimbabwe, and then import the abalone back to South Africa, ultimately exporting them to Hong 
Kong or China with fraudulent permits. Upon import to Hong Kong or China, the importer declares 
the content of his shipment and the customs officials record the origin and volume of the imported 
abalone, meaning that the illegally-sourced abalone has now entered the legal market and are 
indistinguishable from legally-sourced abalone. The second possibility is to store dried abalone in a 




           
          Most traffickers are bold risk-takers who work with family members or form alliances with 
Chinese transnational smugglers work with networks of organizers that resemble a group of 
entrepreneurs rather than a criminal organization.
189
 These Asian business people hide their illicit 
operation behind licit companies.
190
In some instances, companies are created in order to facilitate 
export, which pass customs with fraudulent documentation.
191
  There are major challenges in the 
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investigation and subsequent prosecution of actors at the final stage of abalone poaching and 




3.5 Towards new form of abalone poaching 
          There are some worrying trends for the future. As the abalone stocks are depleting criminals are 
seemingly looking for other ways to source abalone. Traffickers have begun targeting the legal supply 
chain, which includes storage factories, transit vehicles and abalone farms.
193
 In 2015 a group of 
armed and masked men overpowered security personnel and stole an undisclosed amount of abalone 
from the DAFF. The abalone in question had been confiscated by the department in previous 
operations and had been stored at a Forestry and Fisheries abalone storage facility.
194
 During a similar 
incident in Gansbaai in 2017, armed men stole 1.6 tons of dried abalone from the Gansbaai Harbor 
which was valuable at $220,000. This new form of abalone poaching highlights the need to curb 
demand in the consumer countries.  
3.6 Implications of different activities along the value chain on prosecuting abalone poachers 
           The deconstruction of abalone poaching highlights how the wildlife crime can link to offences 
under other legislation that deals with different areas along the value chain. In the harvesting stage 
legislation prescribing protected areas or specifying fishing gear can prove relevant. While 
transporting and processing the illegally sourced abalone, provisions relating to public health or 
corrupt practices may be violated. During the trafficking stage, legislation dealing with offences 
relating to customs and excise, falsification of customs permits, mislabelling shipments and 
smuggling is relevant. Thus, there is a clear relationship of wildlife trafficking with other crimes but 
commercial and organised crime as well as corruption. The following chapter will identify, outline 







                                                          
192
   Lambrecht, D & Goga, K ‘Money and Marginalisation: The lost war against abalone poaching in South 
Africa’ (2016) 43 Politikon at 235. 
193
 Kimon de Greef ‘Armed robbers are now targeting these valuable shellfish’ National Geographic 14 
November 2017 available at https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/wildlife-watch-armed-robbers-
abalone-farm-heists/, accessed on 12 January 2018 
194





CHAPTER 4: LEGAL TOOLS AVAILABLE TO COMBAT ABALONE POACHING AND 
RELATED TRADE 
4.1 Introduction 
          The quest to counter poaching is at a critical stage and the authorities need every effective tool 
at their disposal.
195
 ‘Given the inter-connected and complex nature of fisheries crime ... successful law 
enforcement approach to addressing these crimes cannot focus exclusively on addressing one type 
only; rather, what is required is a coordinated criminal law enforcement response at the domestic and 
international level that recognizes the wide variety of forms fisheries crime can take’.
196
 This extends 
well beyond the scope of fishing per se and is rooted in the use of all potentially applicable laws
197
, 
where the following chapter has the aim to identify the potentially applicable laws. The link between 
abalone poaching and related trade and other offences provides additional potential charges and 
approaches. Brining charges based on different areas of legislation will mean that additional charges 
can be added without a fear of duplication and can substantially add to the combined maximum 
penalty available at sentencing.
198
 Some of these offences might be taken more seriously by the courts 
and thus contribute to higher conviction rates and harsher penalties.  
  
          Chapter 3 outlined how abalone poaching and trafficking is enabled by other criminal activities, 
including corruption, organised crime and tax evasion. The following chapter will identify the statutes 
that regulate the criminal activities at hand and examine how their provisions apply throughout the 
illegal abalone trade. 
 
4.2 The Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 
          The Marine Living Resources Act
199
 (hereinafter MLRA) provides a framework for the 
protection of abalone in South Africa. The MLRA aims at conserving marine living resources for 
present and future generations and to ensure their optimal utilisation and ecologically sustainable 
development, the endorsement of a precautionary approach in marine living resource management and 
the need to use marine living resources to promote economic growth and create employment.
200
 The 
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MLRA and its regulations, read in conjunction with NEMA, provide a basis for administrative as well 
as criminal enforcement and penalties for fisheries offences. 
4.2.1 Application 
          The MLRA applies to ‘fish’, which is broadly defined as ‘the marine living resources of the sea 
and the seashore, including any aquatic plant or animal whether piscine or not, and any mollusc, 
crustacean, coral, sponge, holothurian or other echinoderm, reptile or marine mammal, and includes 
their eggs, larvae and all juvenile stages’.
201
 The regulations in terms of the MLRA define abalone as 
any species of the genus Haliotis. The abalone, being a type of sea snail, falls within the definition of 
‘fish’ under the MLRA.  
 
          The MLRA applies to commercial, recreational and subsistence fishers. Commercial fishers 
those local and foreign fishers who harvest ‘for any of the species which have been determined by the 
Minister to be subject to the allowable commercial catch or total applied effort or parts of it’.
202
 In 
order to harvest legally, commercial fishers require a fishing right and permits in terms of the MLRA. 
The abalone is one of the species to be subject to a total allowable catch (TAC) set by the Minister. 
During the fishing period in 2017 the TAC of abalone should not exceed 130 tonnes.
203
 The TAC is 
allocated among those who were granted a fishing right. These commercial fishers with fishing rights 
and appropriate permits in terms of the MLRA can contribute to abalone poaching by violating the 
terms of their rights; namely harvesting abalone beyond the stipulations of their permits or catching 
under-sized abalone. Notably, during the determination of the TAC the responsible committee has 
taken into consideration abalone catches of non-commercial fishers being 10 t and illegal and illegal 




          A contributing factor to the abalone poaching crisis in South Africa is closely linked to 
commercial fishing rights and the allocation thereof. Coastal fishing communities started poaching as 
an important source of livelihood due to inter alia the absence of the governments’ assurance of 
equitable access to marine resources.
205
 This excerpt from an interview with local fishermen in 
Hangberg illustrates a fundamental issue with the allocation of (abalone) fishing rights. The local 
fishermen said that ‘to us, fishing is the only way to make money. Fishing is the world we know and 
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 Parliament of the Province of the Western Cape ‘Report of the Standing Committee on economic 
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is our ancestral right. We should be able to fulfil all the criteria, but almost all of the quotas go to big 
companies, and laws are put on everything. Why does the government not recognise our rights?’
206
 It 
is clear that further steps need to be taken to assure equitable access to marine resources including 
abalone, but in the context of this dissertation the excerpt highlights that prosecutions of abalone 
poachers should be directed at higher level players. In other words, prosecution efforts should be 
directed at those who make the most financial gain from the crime.  
 
          In 2014, the original definition of ‘subsistence fishers’ under the MLRA was repealed and 
replaced by the definition of ‘small scale fishers’.
207
 Accordingly, small scale fishers ‘means any 
member of a small-scale fishing community engaged in fishing to meet food and basic livelihood 
needs, or directly involved in processing or marketing of fish who – (a) traditionally operate in near-
shore fishing grounds; (b) predominantly employ traditional low technology or passive fishing gear; 
(c) undertake single day fishing trips and (d) is engaged in consumption, barter or sale of fish or 




          Recreational fishing refers to fishers who fish ‘for leisure or sport and not for sale, barter, 
earnings or gain.’
209
 Recreational fishers require a permit in terms of the MLRA and are not allowed 
to barter or sell their catch
210
 and as concerns abalone fishing, are not allowed to use equipment other 
than conventional snorkelling equipment.  
4.2.2 Relevant offences under the MLRA and its regulations 
          The MLRA prohibits any person from undertaking commercial fishing or operating a fish 
processing plant without an appropriate permit.
211
 Alternatively, the regulations in terms of the 
MLRA 
212
 provide the general prohibition of collecting or being in possession of abalone except on 
the authority of a permit, transporting abalone in part of whole without a permit and prescribes the 
tool to be used to harvest abalone.
213
 The regulations also limit the size of abalone that is allowed for 
harvest and provide the offence of being in possession of undersized abalone.
214
  Furthermore, the 
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Regulations for the Protection of Wild Abalone (Haliotis midae)
215
 introduced a general diving ban in 
certain areas. The offences under the MLRA are relevant in all stages of illegal abalone trade. The 
divers contravene s(18) of the MLRA which prohibits the undertaking of commercial fishing as well 
as provisions under the regulations which also include the size limit for abalone. The transporters and 
smugglers of abalone contravene the provisions prohibiting the possession of abalone. The operators 
of the abalone processing plants can be held liable for possession of abalone as well as running a fish 
processing plant without a permit.
216
 The offences under the MLRA are subject to penalties including 
fines not exceeding 2million rand or imprisonment not exceeding five years. The consequence of non-
compliance with provisions of the regulation constitutes an offence and is punishable with a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.
217
 
4.2.3The role of the MLRA and its regulations 
          The MLRA and regulations thereof are the fundament on which abalone poaching and 
trafficking cases are built: they contain prohibitions regarding harvesting abalone without a permit, 
prescribe protected areas, criminalize illegal hunting methods and dictate a minimum size for abalone. 
These provisions are relevant in the harvesting stage and relate to divers at the local level who are 
often driven by subsistence and necessity. The prosecution of these low level players does not suffice 
to effectively address abalone poaching because they are not the drivers of abalone poaching and 
trafficking and the prosecution could cause resentment within the communities. Notably, the MLRA 
does not criminalize the aiding and abetting, or accessory, or procuring the offence of abalone 
harvesting related activities. Other jurisdictions criminalize conspiracy or incitement to commit 
wildlife crimes in order to utilize inchoate and ancillary offences in order to be able to prosecute those 
who organise and direct the criminal activity, rather than the low level perpetrators. In this regard, the 
MLRA plays a rather limited role.  However, the MLRA and its regulations prohibit the possession or 
control of abalone, which is highly relevant in the trafficking of abalone because a number of different 
actors can be held liable for the possession of abalone, including higher level players. The transport, 
processing or smuggling of abalone all contain an element related to possession. 
4.3 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
          The Constitutional environmental right is given effect to by the National Environmental 
Management Act
218
 (hereinafter NEMA) which provides a number of guiding principles that apply to 
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all actions of all organs of state.
219
 As concerns abalone poaching and trafficking the NEMA 
principles dictate that the use and exploitation of abalone is responsible and equitable, and takes into 
account the consequences of the depletion of the resource.
220
 NEMA is not directly concerned with 
fisheries but includes a number of relevant provisions to poaching. First, section 34 of NEMA 
empowers prosecutors to apply for costs from persons convicted of criminal offences cited in 
schedule 3 arising from loss or damage caused by the offence committed to any organ of state or other 
person, including the costs of rehabilitating the environment.
221
  
4.4. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
          The Prevention of Organised Crime Act
222
 (hereinafter POCA) penalizes certain organised 
crimes and gang activities, with a focus on money-laundering, racketeering and illegal business 
activities.  It recognises that there is a rapid growth of organised crime and that persons should not 
benefit from the fruits of organised crime. Organised crime activities are harmful to the well-being of 
communities and as such participation or promotion of criminal gang activities should be 
criminalised.
223
 The act contains offences relating to racketeering activities
224
; offences relating to 
proceeds of unlawful activities
225
 and offences to criminal gang activities.
226
 Furthermore, as it is 
relevant to abalone poaching and trade, the act t contains provisions on proceeds of unlawful 
activities, confiscation and restraint orders, forfeiture of property and penalties. South Africa has 
pledged to appropriately charge offenders in relation to wildlife crime and focus investigations on 
dealing with wildlife trafficking as a serious organised crime.
227
  
4.4.1 Relevant definitions under POCA 
          There are several definitions that are important in regards to organised crime activities related 
to abalone poaching and trafficking. Firstly, POCA provisions apply to property and proceeds of 
illegal activities, where unlawful activity means any conduct which constitutes a crime.
228
 Under 
POCA property is defined as ‘money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal 
thing that includes any rights, privileges, claims and securities and interest thereon and proceeds 
thereof’.
229
 The poached abalone itself can be categorised as a corporeal thing and falls within the 
ambit of ‘property’. The proceeds of unlawful activities refer to ‘any property or any service, 
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advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, received or retained, directly or indirectly, in 
connection with or as a result of any unlawful activities carried on by any person.
230
 The proceeds of 
any unlawful activity clearly refer to the monetary gain that criminal syndicates profit from in relation 
to trafficking of abalone. It could also include e.g. the facilities that are bought or rented for the 
purposes of processing abalone. Furthermore, abalone can be regarded as proceeds of a criminal 
activity as it is any property that is derived in connection or as a result of any unlawful activity. 





4.4.2 Relevant offences under POCA 
4.4.2.1 Racketeering related offences under POCA 
POCA contains the criminalisation of racketeering offences in section 2, which reads: 
 
Any person who- 
(a) (i) receives or retains any property derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 
activity and  
(ii) knows or ought reasonably to have known that such property is so derived; and 
(iii) uses or invests, directly or indirectly, any part of such property in acquisition of any interest in, 
or the establishment or operation or activities of, any enterprise; 
(b) (i) receives or retains any property, directly or indirectly, on behalf of any enterprise; and 
(ii) knows or ought reasonably have known that such property derived or derived from or through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; 
(c)(i) uses or invests any property, directly or indirectly, on behalf of any enterprise or in acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation or activities of any enterprise; and 
(ii) knows or ought reasonably to have known that such property derived or is derived from or 
through a pattern of racketeering activity; 
(d) acquires or maintains, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; 
(e) whilst managing or employed by or associated with any enterprise, conducts or participates in the 
conduct, directly or indirectly, of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; 
(f) manages the operation or activities of an enterprise who knows or ought reasonably to have known 
that any person, whilst employed by or associated with that enterprise conducts or participates in the 
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conduct, directly or indirectly, of such enterprises’ affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; 
or 
(g) conspires or attempts to violate any of the provisions of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) 
Shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
There are seven different offences: subsections (a) – (d) deal with property connected to racketeering 
offences, subsection (7) can be used to charge a manager of an enterprise and the employees thereof 
are covered by subsection (e). The existence of an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity and a 
linked between them and the accused must be established in order to convict an accused.
232
 If these 
elements are fulfilled the penalties for any person convicted of racketeering activities is liable to a fine 







          The concept of the ‘enterprise’ is central to the prohibition against racketeering activities 
because the enterprise is the vehicle which the syndicates use to commit abalone related crimes.  
POCA defines an enterprise as ‘any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other juristic 
person or legal entity, any union or group of individuals associated in fact’.
234
 The definition of 
enterprise under POCA is wide, however there are two types of ‘enterprises’ that are relevant to 
consider in relation to abalone poaching and trafficking. Firstly, there is the criminal syndicate that 
poaches and traffics abalone through a pattern of racketeering activities. In order to hold these actors 
responsible for racketeering offences it must be established that the illegal syndicate constitutes an 
enterprise. In S v Eyssen
235
, the court clarified that: 
 
‘The association would at least have to be conscious; that there would  have to be a common factor or 
purpose identifiable in the association; that the association would have to be ongoing; and that the 
members would have to function as a continuing unit. There is no requirement that the enterprise be 
legal or illegal. It is the pattern of racketeering activity, through which the accused must participate in 
the affairs of the enterprise, that brings in the illegal element and the concepts of ‘enterprise’ and 
‘pattern of racketeering activity are discrete. Proof of the pattern may establish proof of the enterprise, 
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          This suggests that abalone poaching syndicates constitute an enterprise under POCA while the 
syndicate is illegal.  The criminal syndicate that organises the harvesting, processing and trafficking 
of abalone is a group of individuals and the court must prove the association in fact. The court also 
assesses the individual contribution of each accused. In relation to the criminal syndicate surrounding 
Ran Wei, a Chinese National who has been charged in absentia, 25 individual members were arrested 
and charged: the defendants include leaders, police officers, former police officers and a 
bookkeeper.
237
           
 
          Secondly, there are corporations that’ are established in order to export illegal abalone out of 
South Africa. The definition suggests that corporations that are created in order to facilitate exports 
fall within the meaning of enterprise and those individuals linked to the companies can be held 
responsible for certain conduct.
238
 These corporations qualify as enterprises under POCA because they 
constitute legal entities. For instance, Virdon Trading CC, a closed corporation duly registered in 
accordance with the Close Corporations Act
239
 was charged as a defendant in the proceedings against 
the Wei syndicate. The Sate argued that Virdon Trading was used to facilitate legal activities as well 
as illegal activities and as such was participates in the activities that amounted to the planned, 
continuous and repeated participation in the unlawful collection, possession, transportation, 
controlling, storing and processing and exporting of abalone.  
 
4.4.2.1.2 ‘Pattern of racketeering offences’ 
 
          According to POCA a pattern of racketeering activity means the ‘planned, ongoing, continuous 
or repeated participation or involvement in any offence referred to in Schedule 1 and includes at least 
two offences referred to in Schedule 1, of which one of the offences occurred after the 
commencement of this Act and the last offence occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of 
imprisonment) after the commission of such prior offence to in Schedule 1’.
240
 Abalone poaching and 
trafficking falls under Schedule 1 of POCA because it can be categorized as ‘dealing in, being in 
possession of or conveying endangered, scarce and protected game or plants or parts or remains 
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          Abalone poaching and trafficking can also trigger other offences of Schedule 1: any offence 




; any offence relating to the 
dealing in or smuggling of ammunition, firearms, explosives or armament and the unlawful 
possession of such firearms, explosives or armament
244
; any offence contemplated in s(1)(1) of the 
Corruption Act
245
 or any offences relating to proceeds of unlawful activities or relating to criminal 
gang activities.  
 
         Considering the activities of the criminal syndicates, several of these provisions could apply. 
The divers and harvester can be held liable for racketeering offences because they, whilst employed 
by any enterprise, participate in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activities.
246
 Subsection (a) applies to intermediaries and processors of abalone: those 
persons receive abalone (i.e. any property) from a pattern of racketeering activity and can be expected 
reasonably to have known that such property was derived from a criminal activity and use any part of 
such property in the operation or activities of any enterprise.
247
 The operation or activities of the 
enterprise is the subsequent trade in abalone. Those who manage processing plants can further be held 
accountable because they receive property on behalf of an enterprise and know that such property is 
derived through a pattern of racketeering activity.
248
The racketeering offences under POCA extend 
over those who organise or manage abalone poaching and trafficking.
249
 Notably, anyone involved in 
the abalone poaching and trafficking syndicates can be held liable under subsection (g) which 
provides that anyone who conspires to violate any provision in s(2) of POCA. 
4.4.2.2 Money laundering offences under POCA 
          There are two types of money laundering linked to abalone poaching. First, if transnational 
criminal networks integrate the proceeds of illegal abalone trade into the legitimate economy.
250
 These 
money-laundering offences are committed when certain acts are performed in in respect of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities and a person benefits from it. In simple terms, a money laundering 
scheme commences with a deposit of illegally acquired money into a bank account. The funds are 
then converted into monetary instruments and can be withdrawn or used to buy expensive goods or 
property. When these goods are sold the proceeds are deposited again and appear as legally acquired 
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funds. Such schemes enable criminal syndicates to profit from their trafficking activities and enjoy the 
profit they make while hiding the true origin of the funds. The second form of money laundering 
crime is when syndicates use their proceeds, legitimate or not, to further a criminal activity.
251
 
          
 The key provision for the criminalisation of money laundering under POCA reads: 
 
Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is or forms part of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities and – 
(a) enters into any agreement or engages in any arrangement or transaction with anyone in 
connection with that property, whether such agreement, arrangement or transaction is legally 
enforceable or not; or (b) performs any other act in connection with such property, whether it is 
performed independently or in concert with any person, which has or is likely to have the effect of 
(i) of concealing or disguising the nature, sources, location, disposition or movement of the said 
property or the ownership thereof or any interest which anyone may have in respect thereof; or 
(ii) of enabling or assisting any person who has committed or commits an offence, whether in the 
Republic or elsewhere – 
(aa) to avoid prosecution; or 
(bb) to remove or diminish any property acquired directly, or indirectly, as a result of the commission 
of an offence 




          These offences can only be committed by an individual who knows or ought reasonably to have 
known that the property concerned constituted the proceeds of unlawful activities.
253
 A person had 
knowledge of a fact if he actually knew that fact, or if the court is satisfied that the person believed 
that there was a reasonable possibility of the existence of that fact and then failed to obtain 
information to confirm or disprove that fact
254
, meaning that if a person had a strong suspicion that the 
property might be tainted and nevertheless proceeded with the transaction without making reasonable 
inquiries the court can conclude that the person had full knowledge. A person acted negligently, in 
other words ought reasonable have known, if he or she failed to recognise or suspect a fact with the 
general knowledge that may be expected of a person in the position of the particular person.
255
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4.4.2.3 Criminal gang related activities 
          POCA contains offences relating to criminal gang activities
256
 and provides guiding factors for 
considering whether a person is a member of a criminal gang. POCA understands a criminal gang as 
any formal or informal on-going, organisation, association or group of three or more persons whose 
activities amount to a criminal offence
257
 which makes it relatively easy for a criminal syndicate 
involved in abalone poaching and trafficking to fall within this ambit. This means that the criminal 
syndicates can be subjected to the relevant provisions under POCA. However, the court will have to 
take into account inter alia whether the person admits to criminal gang membership, has been arrested 
more than once in company of identified gang members of is identified as a member of a criminal 
gang by physical evidence.
258
 If the court is satisfied that an individual is a member of a criminal 
gang, the individual can be convicted for wilfully aiding and abetting criminal activities for the 
benefit of the criminal gang
259
 or if the individual performs any act with is aimed at promoting or 
contributing towards a pattern of criminal gang activity.
260
 The penalties imposed for gang related 
offences can range from a maximum of three years imprisonment to imprisonment not exceeding 
eight years, depending on the circumstances.  
4.4.2.4 Proceeds of unlawful activities and civil recovery of property 
          The POCA deals with the proceeds of unlawful activities
261
 as well as civil recovery of 
property.
262
 The provisions dealing with the proceeds of unlawful activities include confiscation and 
restraint orders as well as realisation of property. These provisions can be used against offenders 
during different stages of proceedings. In this section it is important to note that abalone can constitute 
both the proceeds of the crime as well as property within the meaning of ‘property’ under POCA. 
 
          Confiscation orders can be used against convicted persons who were found to have benefited 
from a crime.
263
 The benefit in question must be sufficiently related to the offence or another offence 
the defendant bass been convicted at the same trial.
264
  In such circumstances, the court may ‘make an 
order against the defendant for the payment to the State of any amount it considers appropriate and the 
court may make any further order as it may deem fit to ensure the effectiveness and the fairness of 
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Generally, the confiscated amount cannot exceed the value of the proceeds of the crime. 
POCA stipulates that the value of the defendant’s proceeds of unlawful activities shall be the sum of 
the values of the property, services, advantages, benefits or rewards received, retained or derived by 
him or her.
266
 As concerns abalone poaching and trafficking estimating the value of the proceeds can 
prove difficult as some syndicates have been operating for many years which makes it difficult to 
calculate the sum of value derived. 
 
          If there is a final confiscation order against a defendant and the trial has come to an end, a High 
Court may appoint someone to take over any realisable property.
267
 Such realisation order entails that 
the defendant must hand over the property in question to the person appointed by the court.  On the 
other hand, restraint orders can be put on a person’s property meaning that the person cannot transfer 
ownership of that property. As such, restraint orders can prevent suspects from getting rid of evidence 
during the investigation period. Restraint orders can play an important role as investigating the 
various activities of abalone poaching and trafficking syndicates is time-intensive and restraint orders 
can prevent the accused of getting rid of evidence.  
 
          As concerns the recovery of property in civil cases POCA essentially provides that an order, 
namely a preservation of property order, can be issued to stop a person from selling or disposing of 
property, including seizure and forfeiture, but different rules apply.  
 
          A preservation of property order is issued by the High Court if there are sufficient grounds for 
believing that the property in question is an ill-gotten gain or is linked to crime.
268
 This applies to 
movable or immovable property, meaning that a preservation order may prevent an abalone 
processing facility from being sold or mortgaged, If the application for an preservation order has been 
granted and the order has been issued, the High Court may, upon application, forfeit that property to 
the state.  
 
           Provisions allowing for forfeiture of instrumentalities of a crime are fundamental in combatting 
wildlife crime.
269
 Forfeiture orders on the instrumentalities of abalone poaching and trafficking can 
remove the incentive to commit a crime and deter persons from using that property to commit a crime. 
These orders can also neutralise the property that was previously linked to the commission of a crime 
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and forfeiture can advance justice by depriving the involved parties of the use of that property.
270
 In 
making a forfeiture order two elements must be satisfied: the property concerned must be an 
instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1 of POCA and it must be the proceeds of 
unlawful activities (or the property is associated with terrorist and related activities).
271
An 
instrumentality of an offence is defined as ‘any property which is concerned with the commission or 
suspected commission of an offence at any time before or after the commencement of this Act, 




          The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) was established by the NPA to focus on the implementation of 
Chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. The AFU was created to ensure that the power to seize criminal assets 
would be used to fight organised crime and the AFU targets crimes involving natural resources as a 
priority. The key objectives are to take the profit out of the crime and removing property that served 
as an instrumentality of an offence. The AFU froze assets of the more R3,3 million, seized two houses 




4.4.2.5 The controversial sale of confiscated abalone by the DAFF 
          Abalone is frequently confiscated by the authorities during enforcement operations. Even 
though it is estimated that only 14% of poached abalone is confiscated, the value of confiscated 
abalone cannot be underestimated. The confiscated abalone is sold in auctions, meaning that the 
illegally-sourced abalone finds its way into the legal market for abalone. It is claimed that the profits 
made from such auctions is used to fund the DAFF.  
 
          However, the sale of confiscated abalone is highly controversial.  Brenton Holloway, a Senior 
Inspector of Marine Conservation, has stated that ‘the auctions are managed by the compliance office, 
and the money that they make out of the auctions does not go into the operation of the department. In 
fact, there have been too much red tape and competition across units over resources in the department. 
Our manpower and equipment are nothing compared to those professional poachers’. Furthermore, 
Holloway admitted that the way the Department handles confiscated abalone does not present an ideal 
financing mechanism as ‘the problem is that it enables the major players in the black market to benefit 
from the auction, thus further controlling the market. I am not aware that the Department is tracking 
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the sale of this abalone, but from what I know the lines between the legal market and the black market 
are very blurry here in South Africa’.
274
 Furthermore, a Standing Committee Report
275
 on the impact 
of abalone poaching on small-scale fishing communities has found that ‘the sale of confiscated 
illegally obtained abalone by DAFF for far below market value has resulted in the South African 
market for abalone becoming less competitive for other sellers. There is no quality standard that the 





          Furthermore, ‘the fact that confiscated abalone is sold below market value, devalues South 
African abalone on the international market and creates a disabling environment in which our 
fishermen can trade’.
277
Arguably, it is the commercial fishers of abalone who also suffer from the 
DAFF’s auction. The auctions can also enable criminal syndicates to further their smuggling 
activities. Once the abalone has been bought at an auction it can legally be used for trade but this 
affords criminal syndicates the opportunity to buy abalone and launder illegally-sourced abalone into 
the legal abalone. Besides, there are some critics who question the motivation of the DAFF to curb 




4.4.2.6 Relevance of POCA in abalone poaching and trafficking 
          The POCA applies to the stages of abalone poaching and trafficking where organised crime 
syndicates are heavily involved; meaning the processing, transporting and trafficking stage. It is the 
organised crime syndicates that orchestrate and drive the business around abalone poaching related 
crimes thus harsh sentences under POCA can serve as real deterrents. The underlying goal of a 
separate charge under organised crime offences is to target the masterminds or funders of the criminal 
activities which brings certain advantages with it
279
: prosecutions for organised crime related activities 
focus on repeated conduct and overall contribution to the enterprise rather than establishing details 
and specifics of each act committed. Sometimes charging the accused on individual charges can lead 
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to parties and or crimes being left out so if members are charged jointly for the participation to the 
enterprise as a whole, misjoinder and non-joinder problems are avoided. As concerns evidence, one 
indictment covers many indictments and similar fact evidence covers all incidents, making it easier to 
depend on the evidence. Lastly, in some cases corporations are involved in the poaching and 
trafficking process, and in those cases public exposure on the contribution to organised crime and how 
the corporation was connected to criminal activities leads to negative publicity. Nevertheless, the 
different enforcement agencies will have to cooperate closely to enjoy these advantages to prosecute 
organised crime related activities within the abalone poaching and trafficking context. 
 
4.5 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
          Corrupt practices are an enabler for abalone poaching and subsequent trade: it facilitates 
poaching as well as transactions between supply, transit and demand countries and is an important 
source of resilience for organised criminal groups involved in such crimes.
280
 Anti-corruption 
instruments can support governments in combating corruption related to poaching and related trade. 
The primary legislation penalizing corruption and bribery is the Prevention and Combatting of 
Corrupt Activities Act
281
 (hereinafter PCCA) which provides the general offence of corruption. The 
preamble states that corruption and related corrupt activities undermine institutions and values of 
democracy and ethical values and morality as well as they jeopardise sustainable development. To 
strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption and corrupt activities in relevance to abalone 
poaching and trafficking, the act contains a general offence of corruption
282
, offences in respect to 
corrupt activities relating to specific persons including public officers and foreign public officials
283
; 
other offences relating to corrupt activities
284






          The act dictates that any person who, directly or indirectly accepts or agrees to accept any 
gratification from any other person; or gives or agrees or offers to give any gratification to any other 
person; in order to act personally or by influencing another person to so act, in a manner designed to 
achieve an unjustified result, is guilty of corruption.
287
 The meaning of ‘gratification’ is broad: besides 
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cash, it can include the avoidance of punishment or forfeiture and any rights or privileges.
288
 The 
PCCA applies to a wide range of persons in the private and public sector, including public officials 




4.5.2 Relevant offences under PCCA 
         The PCCA applies to low level police officers as well as higher ranking police officers, DAFF 
officials and officers and border posts.
290
 During the harvesting, transporting and processing stage the 
following is relevant: The PCCA can hold any person liable for paying a bribe, whether it is a 
monetary or non-monetary bribe to a police officer in order to avoid punishment for poaching abalone 
or the possession thereof. Said police officer becomes liable for corrupt practices upon the acceptance 
of the bribe. Furthermore, a police officer can be held liable for accepting a bribe for revealing 
information on enforcement operations because the bribe is paid in order to act in a manner that 
misuses or sells information or material that is acquired in the course of action of the police officers’ 
duties or functions. Similarly, the person paying the bribe can be held accountable under PCCA. 
During the trafficking stage, a public official, at customs or border controls, is liable for corrupt 
practices if the official accepts a bride for the purpose of issuing a false license as an abuse of position 
or authority. The person who is paying the bribe or other form of gratification is also liable for corrupt 
practices. 
  
          Thus the PCCA covers the corrupt practices that facilitate abalone poaching and trafficking at 
all stages and as have the potential to play a big role is dismantling the criminal activities linked to 
abalone poaching and trafficking. However, there are some issues: there are certain circumstances 
where police officials serve as witnesses or give testimonies in abalone or fisheries related cases and 
charging those officials with corrupt practices in other cases would undermine the on-going trials. For 
instance, when a high-powered SARS investigator was arrested for taking bribes or referring 
defaulters to private consultancy firms in which they had interests, the arrest threatened to jeopardise 
sensitive tax probes and tax-related court against abalone syndicates.
291
 The SARS investigator, 
Botha, was set to be a key witness in several high court actions against a syndicate of abalone 
smugglers, who claimed that several SARS inspectors were involved in the smuggling process.  
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4.5.3The relevance of PCCA in abalone poaching and related trade  
          The PCCA is highly relevant in terms of abalone poaching and trafficking in all stages. 
Allegations of low level corruption within the SAPS are widespread: there are numerous allegations 
that police officers in some coastal towns are on the payroll of poaching syndicates.
292
Officers of the 
DAFF are tasked with patrolling landing sites and harbours to ensure that fishers are compliant with 





 revealed that local enforcement officers within the directorate 
were paid paid-off with monetary and non-monetary bribes and often become informants for those 
who paid the bribes, sharing secret information detailing enforcement operations.
295
 If officers could 
not be bought off, they were instead threatened with violence; a practice that evidently widespread.
296
            
 
4.6 The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 
          The Customs and Excise Act
297
 (hereinafter the CEA) has the purpose to inter alia provide for 
the levying of customs and excise duties as well as for the prohibition and control of the importation, 
export of manufacture of certain goods.
298
 The CEA is administered by the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS). SARS is the South African tax collecting authority which is established under the 
South African Revenue Service Act
299
 as an autonomous agency. It is mandated with administering 
South Africa’s tax system and customs service, meaning that it collects and administers national 
taxes, duties and levies and provides customs services that facilitates trade, maximises revenue and 
protects borders from illegal importation and exportation of goods. The SARS is tasked with 
controlling prohibited and restricted goods and exercises controls through quota requirements, 
permits, authority or certificates. Abalone is listed under the Prohibited and Restricted Goods List 
according to s(113) of the CEA which means that there are controls when exporting abalone.
300
  The 
provisions of the CEA are relevant at the last stage of the abalone value chain, namely when abalone 
is traded out of South Africa. The aforementioned methods of smuggling abalone out of the country 
require falsified documentation for the exports.   
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          The penalties under the CEA include both administrative and criminal measures. The CEA 
distinguishes between less serious offences and serious offences and the severity of penalties 
increases in regard to the extent of the infringement. However, the improper use of a license, permit 
other document is considered a serious offence.
301
 The ‘improper use of license, permit or other 
document issued in respect of goods’
302
 constitutes an offence which is punishable with a fine not 
exceeding R 20000 or treble the value of goods in  respect of which the offence was committed and/ 
or imprisonment not exceeding five years.  Furthermore, making false statements in connection to any 
matter dealt with under the CEA also constitutes an offence which can lead to a fine not exceeding 
R40000 or treble the value of the goods or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years.
303
 
However, in regards to the latter, the accused can prove he was ignorant of the falsity of such 




4.6.1 The relevance of the CEA  
          The relevance of customs declarations in combating illegal wildlife trade is best illustrated by 
the Bengis Case.
305
 The Bengis case involved the criminal syndicate surrounding Arnold Benigs, who 
illegally harvested massive amounts of South African rock lobster and Patagonian toothfish in order 
to make huge profits on US markets.
306
 As concerns customs rules, the syndicate overharvested 
marine resources for nearly a decade and underreported their catch to the South African authorities 
and submitted false export documents to the SARS. Upon arrival at in the US, correct import 
declaration were made. Ultimately, the relevant authorities compared the documentation and the 
Bengis scheme was unearthed. This case illustrates the importance of customs data and the 
cooperation of the relevant authorities in investigating wildlife trafficking.  
          
           Tax evasion and avoidance, the non-payment of duties, tariffs and other fees are common 
offences in wildlife trafficking.
307
 Failure to pay the relevant duties, taxes and fees seriously 
undermines economic development and deprives governments and local communities of revenues 
streams. Furthermore, these offences create unfair competition which can pose a serious threat to 
those who trade abalone in compliance with the relevant legislation and pay the relevant fees.  
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          The CEA is also relevant because it can be used to punish the corporation used to smuggle 
abalone abroad. In one case, the prosecutors charged Virdon Trading, the company used to export the 
abalone with similar charged and ultimately charged the company with a R400000 fine.
308
 Virdon 
Trading CC, an entity allegedly registered in 2010 and licenses to export fresh produce was held 
responsible for ‘participating in unlawful activities that involved intricate planning and continuous 
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4.7 Summary of key findings  
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4.8 South African courts’ approach to abalone poaching and related trade 
4.8.1 Pre-2002 
4.8.1.1 Possession and transport  
          In S v Packereysammy
310
 the defendant was charged with a contravening regulation 38(3)(b) as 
he was found in possession of 6140 abalone and for that was convicted in the Caledon Magistrate’s 
Court and sentences to 18 months imprisonment. Packerysammy appealed against both the conviction 
and the sentence and raised five grounds for appeal: namely (1) that the magistrate’s court over-
emphasised the gravity of the offence; (2) that the sentence was wrongly intended by the magistrate to 
be exemplary; (3) that he was a first offender; (4) the magistrate was not sufficiently proactive and 
thus over-emphasised retribution and deterrence to the exclusion of other objects of punishment and 
(5) that the offender should have been sentenced to correctional supervision or community service or 
a suspended license. The Cape High Court did not agree with any of those grounds. The court held 
that abalone possession was a very serious offence and that the magistrate’s sentence was severe but 
not inappropriately so.
311
 The accused had referred to a previous case of S v Prinsloo
312
, in which the 
defendant was sentenced to suspended sentences, in order to argue for a lesser sentence. The Cape 
High Court made a clear distinction between S v Prinsloo and the case at hand because the former was 
found in possession of 50 abalone, whereas Packereysammy was found in possession of more than 
6000 abalone. On the appropriateness of the sentence the court considered the role played by the 
applicant, but found no evidence that he was not a vital part of the criminal enterprise
313
 and further 
argued that the interests of the community and the seriousness of the offence had to be taken into 
account and concluded that direct imprisonment was appropriate. The judgement in Packereysammy 
demonstrated that courts are willing to serve harsh sentences and impose direct on first time offenders 
for abalone poaching. In this regard the court stated that ‘the submission was made that because the 
appellant was a first offender he should have been given a sentence that would ensure that he was kept 
out of jail. A first offender has no right to be kept out of jail. It all depends on the circumstances of 
each case. It has been held that any serious offence can lead to imprisonment and frequently 
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          In S v Van Dyk
315
 the accused faced three charges of contravening regulations 9s(36)(1) and 
regulation 38(3)(b) under the MLRA regarding the illegal possession and transport of abalone. Van 
Dyk pled guilty and was convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. The Hermanus 
Magistrate’s court argued that correctional supervision could not be imposed for a statutory offence 
uncles it was expressly included as a sentencing option in the statute.
316
On appeal the Court Cape 
Court agreed and a further appeal to the SCA dealt with the question whether a sentence of 
correctional supervision could be imposed for a statutory offence if the penalty provision of the statute 
did not provide for correctional supervision’.
317
          
 
4.8.1.2 Illegal fish processing plant  
          After being arrested for the possession of 37356 units of abalone, Zhanyang and Kekun pled 
guilty to charges of conducting an illegal fish processing establishment and illegal possession of 
abalone. The state’s advocate argued strongly in favour of imposing a prison sentence as opposed to a 
fine. He argued that it is the court’s responsibility to protect South Africa’s natural resources and 
biodiversity and in cases of organised crime where the accused if caught their employer simply pays a 
fine meaning that there is no risk and these fines are probably factored into the business plan.
318
 
Zhanvang and Kekun were sentenced in the Port Elizabeth Regional court to three years 
imprisonment.                   
 
4.8.2 Post 2002/2003 
          The previously mentioned cases were heard against the backdrop of the establishment of the 
environmental court in Hermanus and the parallel changes to the MLRA. The MLRA allowed 
prosecutors to build stronger cases and obtain higher number of custodial sentences which proved 




           
          Furthermore, in 2002/2003 the approach to investigating criminal syndicates and prosecuting 
abalone poachers changed. The DSO was involved in the investigation and prosecution of the Marx 
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Crime syndicate, led by Elzette Marx in Gansbaai.
320
 The DSO found that the syndicate had exploited 
the abalone resources in the area and was involved in dealings with Chinese buyers. The investigation 
led to the arrest of 66 members or associated of the syndicates of which 44 were convicted.
321
 Marx 
was sentenced to four years direct imprisonment for racketeering and money laundering charges under 
POCA. Arguably this case presents a shift towards acknowledging the role of criminal syndicates in 
abalone poaching and prosecuting them under POCA. 
 
4.8.2.1 Racketeering and money laundering  
          In S v Roberts and others
322
 the accused faced multiple charges arising from contraventions of 
the regulations of the MLRA relating to the illegal possession of abalone. Further charges were 
brought under POCA for conducting or participating in the operation of an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activities as well as managing an enterprise conducted through a pattern of 
racketeering activities. In this case the court made clear that the matter was not only concerned with 
abalone poaching, but with being involved in racketeering activities, namely the unlawful trade in 





         In the case against Wei
324
, 30 individuals are accused of running an abalone poaching syndicate 
and face 590 charges. Among the accused is Anthony Broadway, a defence attorney who has 
represented a number his co-accused in the past.
325
 Broadway faced racketeering and money 
laundering charges. He has been charged with contravening section (2) of POCA for receiving or 
retaining property which was aware was derived from racketeering. The racketeering charges allege 
that Broadway received various sums of cash as fees from member of the syndicate, while being 
aware that they did not have legal income to pay his fees.  In addition, he has been charged with 
several money laundering offences under sections (4),(5) and (6) of POCA. The money laundering 
charges against Broadway relate to a number of payments made from and to his accounts that 
presumably are criminal proceeds and supposedly laundered by Broadway. The case against 
Broadway ‘stands as an exemplar of the precarious position of South African lawyers representing 
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clients who profit from criminal conduct’
326
 and removes all doubt about the criminalisation of tainted 





          Ran Wei, a Chinese national, was implicated in some of the largest abalone poaching syndicates 
in South Africa. His involvement in the syndicate including Frank Barends and 24 others who 
cumulatively ran an abalone poaching ring worth R 2 billion is known.
328
 The syndicate, involving ex-
police officers, pastors, bookkeeps and politicians besides Broadway, was largely funded by Ran Wei. 
Allegedly, Wei ordered and paid for three abalone processing plants and employed those he put in 
charge running the facilities.
329
 Furthermore, Wei is accused of facilitating the smuggling of abalone 
to Asia by using his successful South African crayfish-exporting business as a front for the illegal 
trafficking.
330
 Ran Wei was arrested in 2015 but managed to escape the country. Currently he is on a 
number of international most wanted lists. This case is representative for a number of foreign 
individuals that managed to escape South African justice: a majority of transnational traffickers in 
abalone have been Asians
331
 but these frequently avoid prosecutions even if arrested as they are 
released on bail and leave the country. 
 
                    In a recent case the Western Cape High Court convicted Philip Miller, Willem van 
Rensburg, Adriaan Wildschutt and Tony du Toit (hereinafter the Millers case) for their participation 
in an enterprise’s affair through a pattern of racketeering.
332
 The companies ‘Rapitrade 109 PTY Ltd’ 
and ‘Syroun Exports PTY Ltd’ were created in order to facilitate the illegal export of abalone by 
pretending the export containers were filled with frozen pilchards. The court first considered the 
modus operandi of the alleged ‘joint enterprise’ to consider its existences as well as the participation 
of the accused.
333
  The court observed that ‘the process of procuring abalone illegally, processing it at 
an illegal FPE, packing and storing it in a safe cold store facility; loading it on board a vessel for 
transhipment overseas, and the diversion of the proceeds of sale thereof from the tentacles of the 
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          In another recent case, the Regional Court in Khayelitsha sentenced four men to a combined 
total of 127 years in prison, which is believed to be a record sentence to date. The four men were 
arrested in 2010 and faced charges related to the illegal possession, processing and export of abalone 
as well as fraud and money laundering.
335
 Upon the arrest about 98981 units of abalone valued at 
approximately R20million and various items of equipment were seized. The Hawks spokesperson 
Captain Llyod Ramovha welcomed the harsh sentences and hopes that they will deter those who are 





          The presented case law suggests that South African courts have recognised abalone poaching as 
a serious crime and are willing to impose harsh sentences, including direct imprisonment on first time 
offenders. The more recent case law from 2003, namely the Roberts case and the Millers case, suggest 
that the courts recognise the link between abalone poaching and organised crime; in other words since 
2002/2003 there has been an increase of convictions of members of abalone poaching syndicates 
under POCA. It is suggested that ‘the period from 2003 and 2004 seems to have been the period when 
the monitoring system produced the most effective results. Fines for poaching of abalone skyrocketed, 
abalone poaching syndicates were infiltrated and their leaded jailed and a number of high profile 
arrests were made.
337
This development is in line with the paradigm shift towards perceiving illegal 
fishing, including abalone poaching, in its broader context as fisheries crimes.  Yet, some aspects of 
the transnational element of abalone poaching and trafficking remain a challenge for the judiciary. For 
instance, foreign nationals, who reportedly finance abalone poaching operations, escape South 
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CHAPTER 5: ASSESSING LEGAL TOOLS TO COMBAT ABALONE POACHING AND 
TRAFFICKING AND IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES           
 
         While fisheries crime, including abalone poaching and trafficking, has begun to receive the 
attention it deserves, there is still a long way to go. Governments around the world struggle to address 
organised crime in the fisheries sectors. It is suggested that this is due to legislative frameworks being 
inadequate and law enforcement tools being underutilised.
338
This chapter identifies the strengths, 
weaknesses, threats and opportunities of the aforementioned legislation in order to arrive at 
recommendations to curb illegal abalone poaching and trafficking. However, since these legal tools 
are to be considered within the criminal justice system of South Africa, some general remarks must be 
made.  
5.1 The international sphere: The potential of CITES 
          Asner argues that transnational fisheries crimes should be approached with a focus on three key 
components in order to prosecute and investigate successfully, namely the demand side, the supply 
side and the money flow.
339
 This dissertation focused on the prosecuting offences on the supply side, 
but it must be noted that, as the abalone and trafficking crisis is driven by the demand for abalone 
from East Asia, any successful approach to combat abalone poaching needs to take measures to curb 
or control demand for abalone in East Asian countries.            
      
          TRAFFIC conducted a consumer survey analysis
340
 of abalone consumers in Hong Kong which 
inter alia concluded that respondents were most aware of abalone species becoming threatened (57%) 
than about illegal taking of abalone from the wild in South Africa (46%) and even fewer were aware 
of the availability of illegally- sourced abalone in Hong Kong (35%).
341
 The survey analysis revealed 
that ‘around half of the surveyed consumers were less inclined to consume abalone after learning 
about the endangered statues of some wild abalone species, and that illegal sourced abalone are 
available in Hong Kong’.
342
 This highlights the need to alert consumers and raise awareness on issues 
surrounding abalone in consumer states.  
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         Furthermore, a regulatory system that is capable of restricting the illegal international abalone 
trade across producer, transit and market countries is still urgently needed.
343
  CITES provides the 
opportunity to control the international trade in illegally-sourced abalone if the South African abalone 
were to be re-listed under CITES Appendix II or III. A listing under Appendix II would require an 
importing State to only allow trade in abalone with an export permit or a re-export certificate.
344
 The 
Scientific Authority of the South African government would be required to develop a Non-Detriment 
Finding to determine the legal limits that should be placed on abalone.
345
 In order to be listed under 
Appendix II the Conference of the Parties to the Convention must support the listing with two thirds 
of members present and voting.
346
 In contrast, a listing under Appendix III can be done unilaterally by 
a range State of the species at any time.
347
 Furthermore, for a listing under Appendix III, a Non-
Detriment Finding is not necessary. However, the export requirements under Appendix III only relate 
to the State that listed a species under Appendix III. A Certificate of Origin is necessary for export of 
wild species needs to be issued by the exporting state
348
; however the Certificate of Origin does not 
involve any determination on whether the specimen was illegally harvested. Such listing would create 
a loophole that could be exploited by illegal traders. When specimens of an Appendix III species are 
smuggled into a country that did not list the species under CITES and subsequently laundered as a 
legitimate product of that country. Thus an Appendix II listing may be more effective in countering 
laundering practices because CITES parties are required to assess the legality of origin of specimen 




          The decision whether to list abalone under Appendix II or III must be made by the South 
African government and should be, as TRAFFIC suggests, ‘informed by widespread discussions with 
legal abalone farmers and traders, and with consumer and transit countries, prior to a listing proposal, 
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5.2 Assessment of the tools 
          As the symposium on fisheries crime noted, the use of a ‘multi door’ or ‘full force of the law’ 
approach is required to identify and subsequently investigate and prosecute transnational organised 
fisheries crime.
351
 The ‘multi-door’ or ‘full force of the law’ approach means that the entry point into 
investigation is via any criminal offence in any jurisdiction along the value chain. South Africa has 
legislation in place that can be used to combat fisheries crime, including abalone poaching and 





          As identified above, the legislation related to abalone poaching and trafficking contains 
criminal offences attracting both fines and imprisonment sentences. This is a strong advantage as 
severe punishments combined with a high probability of conviction lead to increasing levels of 
deterrence.
353
Conventional wisdom holds that the threat of harsh punishments, such as imprisonment, 
has deterrent effects on potential offenders: it is assumed that criminals weigh the potential benefits of 
committing a crime against the potential costs of being caught and prosecuted.
354
 However, it takes a 
well-functioning justice system to achieve this deterrent effect and the South African justice system is 




          There is a lack of environmental prosecutors.
356
 However, there are some notable developments 
in that area. In 2017, the second Justice College and DEA collaborative workshop entitled 
‘prosecuting environmental crime course’ was presented in the Eastern Cape. It focused on issues 
experienced in coastal areas with additional attention given to inter alia abalone poaching.
357
Besides 
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training prosecutors, such workshops have the added benefit that they raise awareness of fisheries 




          The Criminal Procedure Act
359
(hereinafter CPA) provides for procedures and related matters in 
criminal proceedings.
360
 This includes provisions on bail
361
, which generally refers to an amount of 
money paid to ensure the temporary release of someone who has been arrested for committing a 
crime. As regards environmental crimes, the CPA does not make any specific reference in its 
Schedules, but ‘any offence for which the punishment may be a period of imprisonment exceeding 6 
months, without the option of a fine’ is listed under Schedule 1. This includes offences under the 
MLRA, POCA, CEA and PCCA. Notably, if the accused has been previously convicted of a Schedule 
1 offence or has a pending case against him or her, the offence will fall under Schedule 5 of the CPA. 
If the offender is accused of a Schedule 1 offence, he or she is entitled to bail unless the state can 
prove that it is in the interest of justice to deny bail. However, if he or she is accused of a Schedule 5 
offence the accused must prove that to the satisfaction of the court that it is in the interest of justice 
that bail is granted; in other words it is harder to be released on bail if accused of a Schedule 5 
offence. Yet, most abalone poachers and traffickers fall under Schedule 1, meaning that in order to 
prevent the accused from leaving the country it is worth considering amending the CPA to including 
poaching offences under Schedule 5 of CPA. 
 
5.2.1 Assessing the Marine Living Resources Act 
          In regards to abalone poaching and trafficking, the illegal fishing offences are regulated under 
the MLRA. These offences attracted penalties under the MLRA and as such form the predicate 
offence of abalone trafficking. The provisions under the MLRA and its regulations are detailed and 
criminalize a number of activities: the harvesting of abalone, including the harvesting of abalone 
outside permitted quotas, undersized abalone or with inappropriate tools. In addition, the possession 
and processing of abalone is criminalized and marine protected areas established by regulations under 
the MLRA. The provisions under the MLRA have certain strengths. Firstly, they can cover a broad 
range of activities along the abalone value chain, i.e. traffickers can be held liable for the possession 
of abalone in the final stage of the value chain. Secondly, these offences attract criminal measures, 
with options of punishment by fine or imprisonment.  
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          Additional sentencing options can be derived from NEMA. NEMA provides that ‘whenever any 
person is convicted of any offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the court convicting such 
person may summarily enquire into and assess the monetary value of any advantage gained or likely 
to be gained by such person in consequence of that offence and, in addition to any other punishment 
imposed in respect of that offence, the court may order the award of damages or compensation or a 
fine equal to the amount so assessed’.
362
 The offences listed under Schedule 3 of NEMA do not relate 
to illegal harvesting of marine resources but could include contraventions of international 
conservation and management measures in terms of NEMA s(43)(2), s(45) and s(58)(2).
363
 It is within 
the power of the Minister to amend Schedule 3 of NEMA by a regulation.
364
 This provision remains 
under-utilised but it presents an opportunity to increase the deterrence factor of fines for abalone 
poaching and trafficking. If the courts were able to impose additional fines equal to the monetary 
value of poached abalone this could have a significant impact because the syndicates smuggle abalone 
worth millions. 
 
         An opportunity arising under the MLRA is to increase seizure of property.  Even without a 
warrant, a FCO can seize ‘any vessel including its gear, equipment, stores and cargo, and any vehicle 
or aircraft of which he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that is has been or is being used in the 
commission of an offence in terms of the MLRA or in which he or she knows or has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that is has been seized or forfeited in terms of any provision of the MLRA.
365
 
           
5.2.2. Assessing the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
          Using POCA to prosecute abalone poaching and related trade presents several advantages. 
Firstly, the penalties under POCA are high, meaning that they can be used as a deterrent, especially in 
comparison to the two year maximum penalty under the MLRA. Secondly, POCA can cover those 
who enable the smuggling of abalone along the value chain, namely attorneys, accountants and 
financiers. While the MLRA can be used against those who are found in possession of abalone along 
the entirety of the abalone value chain, the POCA can be used against higher level players who make 
abalone smuggling possible.            
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            An essential tool under POCA is its forfeiture provisions. Asner finds that ‘a trafficker 
expecting to make a few million dollars in a trafficking scheme, and facing a small change of 
spending a few years in jail, may decide that wildlife trafficking is worth the risk, especially if he can 
expect to end up with the money after he gets out of jail’.
366
 Forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime 
can be used as a tool to change this and ensure that traffickers are denied the enjoyment of their 
proceeds. POCA provisions enable the AFU to do so.  
 
5.2.3. Assessing the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
          Corrupt practices are a fundamental concern in South Africa. South Africa is a party to the 
United Nations against Corruption
367
 which is the only legally binding universal anti-corruption 
instruments. It covers preventative measures, criminalisation and law enforcement, international 
cooperation, asset recovery as well as technical assistance and information exchange. South Africa 
ratified the convention in 2004, yet Transparency International ranks South Africa at 64 out of 100 
worldwide.
368
 In 2016, South Africa scored 45 out of 100 in regards to the perceived level of public 
sector corruption on a scale where 0 stands for a highly corrupt and 100 for very clean.
369
 In recent 
years this score has not changed significantly.  
    
          South Africa has a desperate need to address corrupt practices in the public sector. As concerns 
abalone poaching and trafficking corrupt practices occur at each stage of the abalone value chain and 
effectively enable the syndicates to profit from their activities. Along the abalone value chain bribing 
police officers and other public officials can ensure safe passage, falsified documentation and insight 
to police operations. Beyond the abalone value chain, some argue that corruption within the DAFF 
undermines the worth of auctioning off confiscated abalone as the proceeds do not end up in the 




           The central piece of legislation addressing corruption, PCCA, does criminalise corrupt 
practices and contains hefty sentences, including imprisonment for life. Even though PCCA does 
criminalise corrupt practices in relation to both lower levels of public officers as well as higher 
ranking public officers, one must note that high level corruption is a priority. The abuse of high level 
                                                          
366
 Marcus Asner ‘To catch a wildlife thief: strategies and suggestions for the fight against illegal wildlife 
trafficking’ (2017) 12 University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review at 18. 
367
 United Nations against Corruption Resolution 58/4 adopted by General Assembly in 2005 
368
 Transparency International ‘Country Profile: South Africa’ available at: 




 Schaefer, Beverly ‘Abalone poaching threatens lives’ IOL 19 December 2017, available at  





officials with high level power is termed ‘grand corruption’.
371
 Yet, in the early stages of the abalone 
value chain the bribing of low level police officers can have significant negative impacts on tackling 
abalone poaching because they are tasked with enforcing legislation at the ground level. However 
severe the sentences are, they can only be used as an effective deterrent if PCCA is enforced and 
prosecutions are successful. In relation to abalone poaching and trafficking this does not seem to be 
the case.            
 
          An important opportunity arising under PCCA is its provision dealing with the failure to report 
corruption
372
, meaning a person in a position of authority who has knowledge or suspicion of an 
offence of corruption, fraud, extortion, forgery or uttering forged document has the duty to report this 
to the SAPS if it involves an amount of R100000 or more. The failure to do so constitutes an offence 
and can lead to imprisonment for a period of up to 10 years. This duty to report is placed on 
individuals who hold positions of authority, including Director-General or equivalent officers of 
national or provincial departments, any public officer in the senior management service of a public 
body as well as managers, company secretaries or directors of companies. If properly enforced and 
implemented, this provision acts as a further deterrent for engaging in corrupt activities. 
           
5.2.4 Assessing the Customs and Excise Act 
           Generally speaking, export offences involve a range of cross-border activities including the 
transportation of goods without the proper authorisation or the export of goods using falsified customs 
declaration. The CEA criminalizes import and export offences with harsh sentences including 
imprisonment for up to ten years. Among other enforcement issues, the proper identification of 
abalone creates a challenge as some officials cannot identify abalone in its dried statues even if the 
cargo is inspected.  
 
         The customs authorities are tasked with inspecting goods at commercial gateways, namely ports 
and borders, in order to prevent the trade in illegal goods. In the context of fisheries crime the analysis 
of trade information is a potentially powerful tool to assess illegal activities and assist efforts to 
combat them.
373
 The identification of discrepancies between export and import figures for abalone can 
shed light on the illegal activities of abalone poaching syndicates: for instance Hong Kong has 
reported the import of abalone from several southern African countries, some of which are 
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landlocked. This reveals the trade routes of the syndicates and highlights the need for international 
cooperation in trade information.  
 
5.3 The road ahead            
                 The case against Bengis demonstrates some very useful lessons learned for moving forward 
with fisheries crime prosecutions.
374
 The Benigs case involved an elaborate scheme, running from 
1987to 2001, to illegally harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters in 
South African waters and export them to the United States in violation of South Africa as well as US 
law. The three defendants, Arnold Bengis, Jeffrey Noll and David Bengis, were directors of the South 
African registered company Hout Bay Fishing Industries (Pty) Ltd, which held legitimate fishing 
rights and quotas under the MLRA, but exceeded quotas grossly. The trio was found guilty on charges 
of violating the US Lacey Act
375
 as well as conspiracy to violate the Lacy Act and sentenced to 
imprisonment, fines and ordered to pay restitution. In the context of this dissertation, the investigation 
and prosecution of the Bengis case is relevant. The Bengis Case highlights the need to understand the 
modus operandi of criminal syndicates involved in fisheries crime in order to identify ways to tackle 
it.
376
 In other words, ‘it boils down to how understanding better how they go about moving their 
illegal goods, what sorts of things they have to do to evade detection, and how they move around 
money both to support the scheme and to launder their illegal profits’.
377
 This will reveal where the 
syndicates leave evidence which will eventually help the effort to disrupt their operations.  
Furthermore, the risks and costs associated with the crimes need to increase in order to make fisheries 
crime less attractive.
378
 As Asner argues, the costs need to outweigh the benefits of committing 
wildlife crimes, namely there need to be high probabilities of being investigated and prosecuted.
379
 In 
the current context this refers to the increased enforcement and implementation of the existing legal 
framework as well as the increased forfeiture of assets associated with wildlife crime so that criminals 
cannot make use of proceeds of their crimes once they return from jail. 
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          If the South African abalone industry were managed well, it would constitute a lucrative 
business contributing to livelihoods of South Africans as well as creating state revenue. However, the 
abalone industry is plagued with a high degree of illegality which ultimately only enables a few to 
benefit from the resource. Witbooi suggests that the first step to tackling illegality in fisheries sectors 
is to diagnose the problem, namely identifying organised crime in the fisheries sector as opposed to a 
fisheries management problem.
380
 Arguably, South Africa has managed to take this first step: since 
2002/2003 an increasing number of abalone related cases were dealt with under POCA, indicating that 
the link between organised crime and the abalone fishery are recognised in courts. South African 
policy documents explicitly recognise the link between wildlife trafficking and organised crime.
381
 
 The second step is to develop an appropriate and effective criminal law enforcement response.
382
 
South Africa has legislation in place that enables law enforcers to resort to different laws at different 
entry points; in other words applicable laws can be found in each stage of the abalone value chain. 
These laws criminalise the serious offences in each stage and prescribe adequate penalties; however 
they generally remain under-implemented. In order to facilitate detection and subsequent investigation 
and prosecution of abalone related offences, law enforcement officers from all relevant agencies must 
cooperate and South African prosecutors must be aware of the tools at their disposal and use them. 
The Benigs case highlights the need for international cooperation to tackle transnational fishery crime 
and proves it is not an impossible task. There is still a long way to go to tackle abalone poaching and 
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